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CLASS-ACTION SETTLEMENTS
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JAMES GRIMMELMANN **
This Article identifies a new and previously unrecognized trend
in class-action settlements: releases for the defendant’s future
conduct. Such releases, which hold the defendant harmless for
wrongs it will commit in the future, are unusually dangerous to
class members and to the public. Even more than the “future
claims” familiar to class-action scholars, future-conduct releases
pose severe informational problems for class members and for
courts. Worse, they create moral hazard for the defendant, give it
concentrated power, and thrust courts into a prospective
planning role they are ill-equipped to handle.
Courts should guard against the dangers of future-conduct
releases with a standard and a rule. The standard is heightened
scrutiny for all settlements containing such releases; the Article
describes the warning signs courts must be alert to and the
safeguards courts should insist on. The rule is parity of
preclusion: a class-action settlement may release future-conduct
claims if and only if they could have been lost in litigation. Parity
of preclusion elegantly harmonizes a wide range of case law
while directly addressing the normative problems with futureconduct releases. The Article concludes by applying its
recommendations to seven actual future-conduct settlements, in
each case yielding a better result or clearer explanation than the
court was able to provide.
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INTRODUCTION
Class action lawyers have a new toy: the future-conduct release.1
A settlement containing such a waiver forgives the defendant for
1. This footnote provides a brief overview of federal class action litigation under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the reader in need of a primer or a
review. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. State class actions are discussed briefly infra Part IV.B.
In a class action, one or more named parties sue or are sued “as representative
parties on behalf of all members [of the class].” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). They may do so if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id. Courts commonly also require that it be feasible to determine objectively who is a
member of the class. See, e.g., In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 248 F.R.D. 389, 395–96
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). In addition to satisfying these common prerequisites, each class must be
certified under one of three subsections of Rule 23(b): 23(b)(1), when class members’
rights are inextricably linked; 23(b)(2), when “final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole”; and 23(b)(3), when
“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members[] and . . . a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
Members of a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3) may exclude themselves from the class;
however, this right is not guaranteed by the Federal Rules for members of classes certified
under the first two subsections. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
A case may proceed as a class action only if the court certifies it as one after
entering findings that the prerequisites above are satisfied, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A),
and directs appropriate notice to the class, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). Any judgment in the
case, whether favorable or not, will be binding on class members. See Pelt v. Utah, 539
F.3d 1271, 1284 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[i]t is well settled that a class action
judgment is binding on all class members” provided that “absent members were ‘in fact’
adequately represented by parties who are present”). After certification, any settlement or
voluntary dismissal of class members’ “claims, issues, or defenses” requires court approval.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). If the settlement would bind class members, the Rule requires
further notice to class members, an opportunity for them to object, a finding by the court
that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” and, for Rule 23(b)(3) classes, a
further opportunity for class members to opt out. Id. It is possible to file simultaneously a
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trespasses it has not yet committed. For example, the proposed
Google Books settlement would have released Google from liability
for copyright infringements committed well into the twenty-second
century. 2 Others would give defendants permission to commit
trespasses, create nuisances, adopt poison pills, and perhaps even
violate the antitrust laws. 3
This is new. And it is a problem. To see why, consider a more
familiar problem in class-action settlements: future claims. Some of
the victims of a mass toxic tort will take years to get sick. A badly
designed settlement can trade away the victims’ rights before they
even know what is at stake. 4 The 1984 Agent Orange settlement
simply did not provide for payments to veterans who died or were
disabled after 1994. 5 Veterans who developed cancer later in the
1990s found the compensation fund gone. 6 All that was left was the
clause of the settlement purporting to bar their claims. 7
class settlement and a motion for certification contingent on approval of the settlement
but in general a so-called “settlement class” must satisfy all of the usual prerequisites for
certification. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–22 (1997).
Class-action litigation is lawyer-directed rather than client-directed. The class is
represented by class counsel, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1), but class counsel “may not have a
full client-lawyer relationship with each member of the class.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 13 (2010). While class counsel have a fiduciary duty to “fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class,” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4), this is a “duty to
the class as a whole [that] frequently diverges from the opinion of . . . the named plaintiff.”
Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 956, 964 (3d Cir. 1983). Indeed, a
settlement may be approved even over the objections of one or more named
representatives. See Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 590–91 (3d Cir. 1999).
2. See Amended Settlement Agreement § 17.3, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F.
Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), ECF No. 770-2 [hereinafter Authors
Guild Settlement] (stating that settlement “shall expire on the date on which the last U.S.
copyright in any Book or Insert terminates”). Since copyright endures for seventy years
after the death of the author, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006), the books of an author who died
in 2050 would have been governed by the settlement through 2120. Any document from
the Authors Guild case identified with an ECF number is available through
http://thepublicindex.org.
3. See infra Part V.
4. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 2001)
(introducing plaintiffs as two Vietnam veterans who developed cancer after the 1994 cutoff date for compensation under the settlement), aff’d in part by an equally divided court,
vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp.
740, 746–48, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (approving settlement of future claims against chemical
companies by Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange), aff’d 818 F.2d 226 (2nd Cir.
1987).
5. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 253.
6. See, e.g., id. at 255–56.
7. See id. at 253. The Second Circuit held that the interests of these future victims
had not been adequately represented in the prior litigation, and thus vacated the
settlement as to them. Id. at 261.

CITE AS 91 N.C. L. REV. 387 (2012)

392

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

Courts and scholars have come to recognize the extraordinary
dangers of future-claim releases for class members. In a pair of
decisions rejecting sweeping asbestos settlements, the Supreme Court
held that the interests of present and future victims are so
unavoidably opposed that the one group cannot “fairly and
adequately protect the interests” of the other. 8 The result is that class
counsel seeking a quick payout for present victims are not allowed to
sell the defendant the class’s future claims on the cheap—at least not
if the court is doing its job. Scholars have produced a voluminous
literature on the “futures problem,” debating when future-claim
releases are appropriate and how best to police their use. 9
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4); see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856–57
(1999); Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997).
9. The term “futures problem” comes from Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., The Futures
Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1902–03 (2000). For discussion of the issues future
claims raise, see generally Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with
Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485 (2003) (discussing
contractarian justifications for ex ante resolution of claims); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995)
(describing dangers of collusion between defendants and class counsel, particularly where
future claims are concerned); Howard M. Erichson, Uncertainty and the Advantage of
Collective Settlement, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 627 (2011) (describing different forms of
uncertainty in class litigation, some of them tied to uncertainty about future events);
Deborah R. Hensler, Bringing Shutts into the Future: Rethinking Protection of Future
Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 585 (2006) (proposing that courts
should require that settlements compensate present and future claimants equally); Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1649 (2008) (discussing how settlement designs can accentuate or dissipate intraclass
conflicts, with application to future claims); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and
Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 345 (1999) (describing
future-claim settlements as “the secular equivalent of a plenary indulgence”); Susan P.
Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate
Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1787 (2004) (discussing treatment of future
claims in Agent Orange litigation); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995) (describing in
detail the problematic terms in one settlement); Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in
Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
581 (2003) (discussing whether present and future claimants should be included in the
same class); Linda S. Mullenix, Back to the Futures: Privatizing Future Claims Resolution,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1919 (2000) (examining the future of future claims resolution following
the Supreme Court’s Amchem and Ortiz decisions); Richard A. Nagareda, Administering
Adequacy in Class Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287 (2003) (discussing different ways of
characterizing present and future claimants); Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and
Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2002) [hereinafter
Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options] (arguing that future claimants should be
given “put options” to sell their claims at a later date); Richard A. Nagareda, Future Mass
Tort Claims and the Rule-Making/Adjudication Distinction, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1781 (2000)
(comparing different institutional mechanisms for handling future claims); Alex
Raskolnikov, Is There a Future for Future Claimants After Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor?, 107 YALE L.J. 2545 (1998) (proposing a “global limited fund mandatory
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settlement class action with a modified pro rata distribution of benefits for past and future
claimants” as a fair and efficient way to deal with mass torts); David Rosenberg,
Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Actions for Future Loss,
88 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2002) (arguing that mandatory global class actions can best
compensate victims while providing optimal deterrence of socially undesirable conduct);
George Rutherglen, Future Claims in Mass Tort Cases: Deterrence, Compensation, and
Necessity, 88 VA. L. REV. 1989 (2002) (commenting on Rosenberg’s argument); Peter H.
Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941
(1995) (arguing for stronger back-end opt-out rights whenever the value of claims is
initially unpredictable); Robert P. Schuwerk, Future Class Actions, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 63
(1987) (arguing that future class actions should only be employed where stringent
preconditions are satisfied); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation,
88 NW. U. L. REV. 469 (1994) (describing potential conflicts between present and future
claimants); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class
Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439 (1996) (discussing the problem of
future injury in the context of asbestos litigation and suggesting changes to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to protect future claimants); Diane P. Wood, Commentary on
The Futures Problem, by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1933 (2000)
(providing an overview of Hazard’s The Futures Problem and suggesting some changes to
the analysis in that article); Note, And Justiciability for All? Future Injury Plaintiffs and the
Separation of Powers, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1066 (1996) (“explor[ing] the justiciability of
actions by future injury plaintiff actions by examining whether a claim of future injury in a
class action presents, in any scenario, an Article III case or controversy”); Jeremy Gaston,
Note, Standing on Its Head: The Problem of Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions,
77 TEX. L. REV. 215 (1998) (arguing for a “bright line denial of standing to exposure-only
claimants in mass tort class actions who seek compensation for their future injuries”);
Elizabeth R. Kaczynski, Note, The Inclusion of Future Members in Rule 23(b)(2) Class
Actions, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 397 (1985) (arguing that including future members in class
actions “is inconsistent with both the explicit requirements and the theoretical
underpinnings of Rule 23” and poses “a serious threat to the due process rights of future
members”); Daniel M. Weddle, Note, Settlement Class Actions and “Mere-Exposure”
Future Claimants: Problems in Mass Toxic Tort Liability, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 113 (1998)
(discussing the major problems facing exposure-only future claimants, ways in which
courts have dealt with these issues, and proposed solutions).
The issue of future claims is also a problem of substantive tort law. See generally
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625
(2002) (aiming to “illuminate and help guide tort practice by attending to a set of
theoretical and conceptual questions” raised by “future injury” or “inchoate tort” cases,
including the role of “injury” in tort law); Andrew R. Klein, Fear of Disease and the Puzzle
of Futures Cases in Tort, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965 (2002) (examining treatment of fear
of disease in toxic tort cases and asserting that courts should permit claimants to recover
damages for emotional distress whenever that fear of disease is reasonable). Because of
these tort-law issues, which vary significantly between states, it is not possible to state a
simple and general rule on when a future claim based on past conduct ripens into one
capable of being litigated. In an asbestos-exposure case, for example, ripeness will depend
on the legal viability of medical-monitoring and increased-risk claims and fact-bound
issues about the threshold of injury that qualifies as compensable. In general, mere
exposure to a substance capable of causing harm will not suffice, but where beyond that
lies the line between “present” and “future” claims is a matter of great and active dispute.
Another significant distinction worth noting is that between present and future
claimants. In some cases—such as the Authors Guild case—there is no significant division
within the class because the future claims are all held by persons who also hold present
claims. In other cases, such as the mass asbestos cases, many of the holders of future
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Future-conduct releases, though, are a bridge beyond futureclaim releases. Consider a simple hypothetical future-conduct
settlement. The Warhol Soup Company sells a bad batch of tomato
soup, leading to a well-publicized outbreak of twenty-four hour food
poisoning. A class-action firm files a suit on behalf of a class of all of
Warhol’s customers, then negotiates a settlement. In return for cash
payments to class members with documented illness, they will give
Warhol Soup a general release for liability arising out of its conduct,
past and future.
There is something obviously wrong with this settlement. But it is
not the same something courts and scholars usually talk about when
they talk about “future claims.” There are no present-future conflicts
within the Warhol Soup class; the stomach bug has already done most
of the harm it will ever do, and the settlement is perfectly uniform
toward class members. 10 Instead, the settlement is flawed in other
ways. For example, the compensation schedule may have been
designed with gastroenteritis in mind, but what if next time it’s
botulism? Worse, the settlement is likely to lead to more food
poisoning in the future because it undermines Warhol Soup’s
incentive to be careful going forward.
Thus, future-conduct releases raise the stakes for class members.
Past-conduct settlements are limited to compensation for harms the
defendant has already caused (even if those harms have not yet
manifested themselves). But future-conduct releases can change the
world in ways that cause entirely new harms to class members.
Because they deal so extensively with the unknown and changeable
future, future-conduct settlements can be unusually hard for courts
and class members to understand. They can create serious moral
hazard for the released defendant in subtle and surprising ways.
Future-conduct releases increase the risks that the reviewing court
will miss the warning signs and approve a bad settlement.
There is also a more fundamental problem: courts should not be
in this business at all. Future-conduct releases open the door to
sweeping prospective changes in the substance of the law. This is the
claims have no present claims. In these cases, there are difficult problems about whether,
and under what circumstances, the holders of future claims may be placed in the same
class as the holders of present claims. Amchem analyzed this issue in terms of adequate
representation: the future claimants could not be included because they were not
vigorously represented by their own unconflicted class counsel. Amchem Prods. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997).
10. Thus, proposals designed to ensure equality between present and future claimants
do not really speak to future-conduct settlements. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 9, at 588.
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province of legislation, not adjudication. The Warhol Soup settlement
is tantamount to tort reform: it takes future product-liability cases out
of the judicial system entirely. But this is not tort reform enacted by a
democratically elected and politically accountable legislature and
imposed equally on all businesses. Instead, it is a private agreement
for the benefit of a single company, drafted in secret by a handful of
lawyers and “enacted” by a judge. In the words of the Department of
Justice, this is “a bridge too far.” 11
Few actual class-action lawyers are this unsubtle. But they are
hardly unambitious or unimaginative. The Google Books settlement
would have established the world’s largest bookstore. 12 The
settlement would have bound millions of class members 13 and
payments to copyright owners could have reached into the billions of
dollars. 14 The pending $7 billion settlement in an antitrust lawsuit
against Visa and MasterCard would prevent businesses—including
ones not yet in business—from objecting to many of their policies
until 2021. 15 Other class-action settlements have tried to use future11. Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed
Amended Settlement Agreement at 3, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 Civ. 8136-DC), ECF No. 922 [hereinafter Statement of Interest
II].
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum Responding to Specific Objections at 2
n.2, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136-DC), ECF No. 955 (estimating
class size at “hundreds of thousands, or millions”); Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book
Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 479, 545 n.350 (2011) (giving reasons
for estimate that settlement class could number tens of millions).
14. “Google . . . scanned more than 12 million books,” Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d
at 670, a large percentage of which are in copyright, see Samuelson, supra note 13, at 545
n.350 (“Google has estimated that 20 percent of the books it has scanned so far from
libraries are in the public domain . . . .”). The settlement called for $45 million in up-front
payments directly to copyright owners. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 2.1.
Future revenue streams under the settlement were necessarily an estimate, but the United
States book market currently brings in revenue of about $27 billion a year. Book Pub. in
the US: Market Research Report, IBISWORLD (June 2012), http://www.ibisworld.com
/industry/default.aspx?indid=1233. If half that market had moved to e-books, and Google
took ten percent of the market, and ten percent of Google’s share came from books under
the settlement, that would have yielded settlement-related revenues to Google of $135
million a year. If the settlement had been a success and catapulted Google to a position of
dominance in the e-book market, those numbers could have been much, much higher.
15. See Class Settlement Agreement ¶ 2(b), In re Payment Card Interchange Fee &
Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., No. 05-MD-1720-JG-JO (E.D.N.Y. filed July 13, 2012), ECF
No. 1588-1 (defining settlement class to include “all persons, businesses, and other entities
that as of the Settlement Preliminary Approval Date or in the future accept [Visa or
MasterCard]” (emphasis added)); id. ¶¶ 39–65 (twenty-seven-page description of new
rules to be adopted by Visa and MasterCard); id. ¶ 71 (stating that the release precludes
class members from seeking relief “relating to the period after the date of the Court’s
entry of the Class Settlement Preliminary Approval Order with respect to any Rule of any
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conduct releases to transfer easements to telecommunications
companies, 16 to insulate the NFL’s pay-per-view packages from
antitrust scrutiny, 17 and to nullify shareholder objections to the News
Corporation’s anti-takeover defenses. 18 If the courts were to allow
future-conduct releases in general, the sky would be the limit: it is
possible to imagine doing eminent domain or health-care reform
through an appropriately crafted settlement. 19
The courts have recognized that future-conduct releases raise
difficult questions. But they have not been able to give satisfying
answers. In a May 2011 decision, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 20 the
Southern District of New York rejected the Google Books
settlement. 21 But five months later, in In re Literary Works in
Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation, the Second Circuit held
that an extraordinarily similar settlement authorizing electronic
databases to sell online access to articles was potentially permissible. 22
Each settlement would have allowed the defendant to make class
members’ copyrighted works available online 23 in exchange for
[defendant] . . . as it . . . may be modified in the manner provided in [the settlement]”); see
also Adam J. Levitin, An Analysis of the Proposed Interchange Fee Litigation Settlement
14–19 (Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2133361 (discussing settlement’s releases with skepticism).
16. See First Amended & Restated Class Settlement Agreement at 13, Uhl v.
Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecomms, Inc., No. IP00-C-1232-B/S, 2001 WL 987840 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 28, 2001), aff’d 309 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2002), available at http://www.
fiberopticfundi.com/adobe/SettlementAgreementForWeb.pdf (defining “Settlement Class
Claims” to include claims that “may be asserted now or in the future . . . relating to . . .
[defendant’s future] installation, operation, maintenance, renewal, marketing, and transfer
[of a fiber-optic cable]”).
17. See Revised Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, ¶ II.y, Schwartz v. Dallas
Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 157 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (no. 97-cv-5184),
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20011218215257/http://www.
nfllawsuitsettlement.com/stipagreement.shtml (defining “Released Class Claims” to
include any claim “subsequently arising out of or resulting from . . . conduct authorized by
the Agreement”).
18. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 898 A.2d 344, 347–48 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“In the
Redrafted Settlement, the parties included a provision clarifying that the release does not
extend to ‘claims challenging the merits of future conduct . . . .’ The same sentence,
however, contains a parenthetical excepting claims relating to the adoption of the October
2006 Rights Plan.”).
19. See infra Part II.
20. 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
21. Id. at 679.
22. See In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 247–49
(2d Cir. 2011).
23. Compare Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 10.1(d) (defining released
claims to include “after the Effective Date, any act or omission authorized by this
Amended Settlement Agreement”), and id. § 4.2 (authorizing sale of digital books to
consumers), with Settlement Agreement § 13.b, In re Literary Works, 654 F.3d 242 (MDL
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payments to class members. 24 They purported to apply the same legal
test. 25 They were even negotiated by the same class counsel. 26 And yet
releases that “exceed[ed] what the Court may permit” 27 in Authors
Guild were “not improper” in Literary Works. 28 In other futureconduct cases, the Seventh Circuit held that it was broadly free to
“address the entire suit” and approve such releases, 29 but the
Delaware Court of Chancery held flatly the opposite: “The rule in
Delaware is that a release cannot apply to future conduct.” 30
If the courts are adrift when dealing with future-conduct releases,
one reason may be that they have had little help from the scholarly
community. The scholarship on future-conduct releases is all but
nonexistent. 31 No one has ever clearly distinguished future-claim
releases from future-conduct releases. A few articles recognize that
class actions raise troubling issues when they purport to adjudicate
the rights of “future class members” who will be injured by actions
the defendant takes in the future. 32 But in many future-conductrelease cases, these “future class members” are the same people as
No. 1379) (providing that articles may “be electronically reproduced, distributed,
displayed, licensed, sold, or adapted by [defendants]”).
24. Compare Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 4.5(a)(i) (requiring Google to
pay to copyright owners seventy percent of net revenues from future sales of the digital
books covered by the settlement), and id. § 5.1(a) (requiring Google to make one-time
payment of sixty dollars for each book previously digitized), with Settlement Agreement
§ 4, In re Literary Works, 654 F.3d 242 (MDL No. 1379) (creating schedule of one-time
payments for the articles covered by the settlement), and id. § 5.a (reducing payments by
thirty-five percent for those authors who opt out of allowing future uses).
25. Compare Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (“identical factual predicate”),
with In re Literary Works, 654 F.3d at 248 (“identical factual predicate”) (quoting TBK
Partners, Ltd. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982)). The identical factual
predicate doctrine is discussed in more detail infra Part IV.B.
26. Compare Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 669 (listing appearance of Michael J.
Boni for Author Plaintiffs), with In re Literary Works, 654 F.3d at 244 (listing appearance
of Michael J. Boni for plaintiffs). See generally Michael J. Boni, BONI & ZACK LLC
(2010), http://bonizack.com/michael-j-boni (listing Boni’s experience as lead counsel on
both settlements).
27. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 677.
28. In re Literary Works, 654 F.3d at 248.
29. Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecomms., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 984 (7th Cir. 2002).
30. Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 898 A.2d 344, 348 (Del. Ch. 2006).
31. Samuel Bray has discussed “preventive adjudication,” in which “a plaintiff seeks
only a declaration and does so to avoid future harm.” Samuel L. Bray, Preventive
Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2010). This concept focuses on purely
declaratory relief: i.e., judgments that merely restate more clearly the contents of preexisting legal norms. But a defining characteristic of future-conduct releases is that they
can deliberately alter parties’ rights prospectively; they go beyond the merely declaratory.
32. See, e.g., Schuwerk, supra note 9, at 67 (defining “future class members” to include
“persons who, at the time of inquiry, have not had the type of contact or relationship with
the defendant that gives rise to the litigation”).
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the present class members who indisputably have present claims
against the defendant. 33
This Article fills this gap. It makes three contributions to the
literature on class actions. First, it identifies a novel feature of classaction settlements: future-conduct releases by class members. Second,
it explains why such releases can be dangerous to class members and
to society. Third, it explains what to do about it.
Courts should not prohibit future-conduct releases outright.
Instead, they should guard against the dangers these releases pose
with a standard and a rule. The standard is an enhancement of the
Rule 23(e) requirement that a court may only approve a class-action
settlement on a finding that it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 34
The Article supplies a list of factors courts should incorporate into
the Rule 23(e) inquiry when they are faced with a future-conduct
settlement. Those factors will help courts think through the distinctive
risks of future-conduct settlements and identify appropriate
safeguards.
The rule is simpler: a settlement may release only those claims
that the class could have lost in litigation. The common thread
running through the problems with future-conduct releases is that
they sever the connection between the settlement and the underlying
lawsuit. The Warhol Soup settlement is not really a “settlement” of
the product-liability lawsuit; it is a freestanding, prospective change in
the applicable law. The class action is just an excuse, a procedural
vehicle that gets the parties into court and is then turned around to
bind class members to the terms of the deal. The result is like a massmarket contract with none of the respect for personal autonomy—or
like negotiated rulemaking with none of the procedural safeguards.
What it is not like is a lawsuit litigated through to judgment.
Requiring parity between litigation and settlement brings futureconduct releases back to earth: it restores the essential nexus that
makes settlements a proper use of judicial power in the first place.
Heightened scrutiny and parity of preclusion aren’t just good
ideas: they’re the law. Each is rooted in the text of Rule 23 and in the
Constitution. Heightened scrutiny flows from the provisions in Rule
23 that ensure adequate representation for class members at all times
and from the Due Process Clause. Parity of preclusion, for its part, is
jurisdictional: future-conduct claims that could not be precluded in
litigation are categorically unripe. They do not present live “questions
33. Future class members are discussed further infra note 236.
34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
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of law or fact” with respect to which a class could be certified under
Rule 23, and they are not part of the same Article III case or
controversy as the underlying lawsuit.
The Article will proceed in five parts, with the Google Books
settlement serving as a running example. Part I will explain in detail
how future-conduct releases work. Part II will explain the normative
problems such releases raise. Part III will introduce and defend the
heightened-scrutiny standard as a simple and administrable response
to their dangers. Part IV will do the same for the parity-of-preclusion
rule. Part V will apply the Article’s recommendations to concrete
cases. A brief Conclusion will do exactly what it says on the tin.
I. FUTURE-CONDUCT RELEASES
In order to understand why future-conduct releases in classaction settlements are dangerous, it is necessary to understand clearly
what a “future-conduct release” is. The place to start is with the
preeminent modern example of one, the rejected Google Books
settlement in Authors Guild v. Google Inc.
A. An Example: Google Books
The Google Books project is the company’s “moon shot,” 35 with
the explicit goal of creating a new Library of Alexandria. 36 Google
ultimately hoped to include a digital copy of every book ever printed
in this universal library. 37 In 2004, Google began partnering with
research libraries, which supply Google with books from their
35. Jeffrey Toobin, Google’s Moon Shot, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 5, 2007, at 30
(quoting Marissa Mayer).
36. See Brief of Google, Inc. in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Amended
Settlement Agreement at 66–67, Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136-DC) [hereinafter Brief of Google in Support] (claiming
that fire set by Julius Caesar in 47 B.C. caused the destruction of 700,000 volumes in the
Library and calling settlement “another small step toward the vision that the Alexandrian
Library represents”); Sergey Brin, A Library to Last Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at
A31 (describing Google Books as a program to prevent the loss of human knowledge, as
occurred in the burning of the Library of Alexandria). Google’s account of the destruction
of the Library is disputed by scholars. See EDWARD ALEXANDER PARSONS, THE
ALEXANDRIAN LIBRARY: GLORY OF THE HELLENIC WORLD 288–319 (Am. Elsevier
Publ’g Co., Inc. 1952) (surveying ancient sources on what did or did not happen to the
Library in 47 B.C.). Ironically, this is the very book Google’s brief cites as an example of a
scholarly work that the settlement would have helped preserve and make available. See
Brief of Google in Support, supra, at 66–67. History aside, the metaphor itself is
problematic. See Mary Murrell, Digital + Library: Mass Book Digitization as Collective
Inquiry, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 221, 226–31 (2010) (tracing history of “universal library”
metaphor).
37. See Toobin, supra note 35, at 30.
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collections. 38 Google takes the books offsite, photographs them using
specially built book scanners, and processes the images with software
to reconstruct the text of the books. 39 The text is fed into an index so
that Google Books’ users can search for terms in the text of the
scanned books. 40 If the library wishes, it can receive a digital copy of
the book in return. 41
Copyright law complicated things, as it always does. Some books
were in the public domain, and some copyright owners gave Google
explicit permission. 42 But for everything else, Google displayed only
short “snippets” as search results: an eighth of a page around the
place the search term appears in the book. 43 After objections from
copyright owners, Google added an opt-out: a book’s copyright
owner could prevent it from being scanned at all. 44 This was not
sufficient for authors and publishers, who filed suit in the fall of 2005
in two parallel lawsuits, one of them styled as a class action. 45 It was
widely expected that Google’s defense would center on fair use. 46
38. For a detailed history of the project, lawsuit, and settlement through the end of
2009, see generally Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding Road to the Google Books
Settlement, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 227 (2009).
39. See Deposition of Daniel Clancy, Authors Guild v. Google at 63, Authors Guild,
770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), filed as exhibit 10 to Declaration of Edward
Rosenthal, Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, No. 11-CV-6351 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012), ECF
No. 114-10 (describing the scanning process).
40. Id. at 64–66.
41. See, e.g., Cooperative Agreement Between Google Inc. and the Regents of the
Univ. of Mich./Univ. Library § 2.5 (Dec. 14, 2004), http://thepublicindex.org/docs
/libraries/michigan.pdf. Further agreements between Google and its partner libraries are
available at http://thepublicindex.org/documents/libraries.
42. See What You’ll See When You Search on Google Books, GOOGLE BOOKS, http://
books.google.com/intl/en/googlebooks/screenshots.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2013)
(describing and illustrating full view and limited preview).
43. See id. (describing and illustrating snippet view).
44. See Adam M. Smith, Making Books Easier to Find, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG
(Aug. 12, 2005, 1:31 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/08/making-books-easier-tofind.html.
45. See Class Action Complaint, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136); Complaint, McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc., No.
05 CV 8881 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005). The two cases were “coordinated for all pre-trial
purposes.” Case Management Order Regarding Coordination and Scheduling at 1,
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136-JES), ECF No. 29. In 2011, the
Authors Guild and other authors’ groups sued five of Google’s library partners over their
use of the digital copies. See Complaint at 1–2, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 11
CIV 6351 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2011).
46. Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement that permits a
defendant to argue that her conduct, as measured by four open-ended and capacious
factors, is more socially beneficial than enforcement of the plaintiff’s copyright would be.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). “The policies underlying modern fair use law include
promoting freedom of speech and of expression, the ongoing progress of authorship,
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Google’s fair use argument is persuasive but hardly conclusive, and
scholarly opinion is split on whether fair use applies. 47
Complicating matters even further were the “orphan books”—
books under copyright, but whose copyright owners cannot be located
by someone wanting to make use of the work. 48 Although estimates
of the number of orphan books vary widely—from well under 500,000
to two million or more 49—their existence makes it all but impossible
learning, access to information, truth telling or truth seeking, competition, technological
innovation, and privacy and autonomy interests of users.” Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling
Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541–42 (2009). A fair use win on summary
judgment would have terminated the lawsuit in Google’s favor. Cf. Viacom Int’l Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc. 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part and vacated in part,
676 F.3d 19 (2d. Cir. 2012) (awarding summary judgment to Google in a putative class
action prior to class-certification motions, specifically finding no infringement due to the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe harbor provision).
47. Compare Matthew Sag, The Google Book Settlement and the Fair Use
Counterfactual, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19, 24–37 (2010) (arguing that a court would have
found fair use), and Hannibal Travis, Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for
Authors, or Napster for Books?, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 87, 126–39 (2006) (giving reasons to
support the fair use argument), with Doug Lichtman, Copyright as Innovation Policy:
Google Book Search from a Law and Economics Perspective, in 9 INNOVATION POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY 55, 62 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8184.pdf?new_window=1 (arguing that “Google’s fair use
claim fails in its current form because its legal argument and its actual practices both
sweep too broadly”). Some scholars take a middle ground. See Oren Bracha, Standing
Copyright Law on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of
Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1855–60 (2007) (“The unpredictability and the ex post
discretionary nature of the present [fair use] doctrine make it a highly unsuitable
foundation on which to build a proper opt-out regime for digital libraries.”); Steven
Hetcher, The Half-Fairness of Google’s Plan to Make the World’s Collection of Books
Searchable, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 21–58 (2006) (arguing that snippets
are a fair use, but that the database and library digital copies are not); Douglas Lichtman,
Google Book Search in the Gridlock Economy, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 137–42 (2011)
(arguing that narrower versions of the Google Books program targeted at orphan works
would be fair); Samuelson, supra note 13, at 487–93 (giving arguments on both sides).
Several courts have held that Google’s Web search engine makes fair uses of the webpages
it crawls and indexes. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 719–25 (9th
Cir. 2007); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1117–23 (D. Nev. 2006). The
plaintiffs, however, dispute the analogy between books and webpages. See Plaintiffs’
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Google’s Motion to Dismiss at 17 n.8,
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), ECF No. 997.
48. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 2 (2006) (“ ‘orphan works[]’ is a term used to describe
the situation where the owner of a copyrighted work cannot be identified and located by
someone who wishes to make use of the work in a manner that requires permission of the
copyright owner.”), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf.
49. See Michael Cairns, 580,388 Orphan Works—Give or Take, PERSONANONDATA
(Sept. 9, 2009), http://personanondata.blogspot.com/2009/09/580388-orphan-works-giveor-take.html (estimating an upper bound of 580,388 orphan books published in the United
States since 1920); JOHN P. WILKIN, COUNCIL ON LIBRARY & INFO. RES.,
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INDETERMINACY AND THE SCALE OF PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES

CITE AS 91 N.C. L. REV. 387 (2012)

402

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

to create a comprehensive book search engine through individual
negotiations. Congress has twice considered but not passed legislation
to allow broader uses of orphan works. 50 Even those bills, however,
would not have enabled Google Book Search, because they would
have required a specific and “diligent” effort to locate the owner. 51
In October 2008, following two and a half years of intense and
secret negotiations 52 the parties announced a proposed settlement. It
ran to over 140 pages with more than a dozen attachments. 53 Between
then and the February 2010 fairness hearing, the settlement received
hundreds of objections including two Statements of Interest
submitted by the United States government raising antitrust and
class-action concerns. 54
Under the settlement, Google would have been allowed to
continue scanning and searching books, much as before. 55 In return, it

OF
“RIGHTS”
IN
DIGITAL
COLLECTION
BUILDING
(Feb.
2011),
http://www.clir.org/pubs/ruminations/01wilkin/wilkin.html/wilkin.pdf (estimating in the
conclusion that 2.5 million orphan books in a collection of 5 million books have been
digitized by Google and its library partners).
50. See Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2d Sess.
2008) (passed in the Senate Sept. 28, 2008 and referred to the House Committee on the
Judiciary); Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006) (referred to
the House Committee on the Judiciary).
51. See Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 § 2 (amending 17 U.S.C.
§ 514(b)(2)(A) to define “qualifying searches” as requiring “a diligent effort”); Orphan
Works Act of 2006 § 2 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 514(a)(1)(i) to require “a reasonably
diligent search”). The Acts were not drafted with mass digitization projects like Google’s
in mind; U.S. Copyright Office, Legal Issues in Mass Digitization: A Preliminary Analysis
and Discussion Document, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (Oct. 2011), http://www.copyright.gov
/docs/massdigitization/USCOMassDigitization_October2011.pdf.
52. Roy Blount Jr., $125 Million Settlement in Authors Guild v. Google, THE
AUTHORS GUILD (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/125-millionsettlement-in-authors-guild-v-google/.
53. See Declaration of Michael J. Boni in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Settlement Approval at 4, 134, 144, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F.
Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), ECF No. 56.
54. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed
Class Settlement, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), ECF No. 720
[hereinafter Statement of Interest I]; Statement of Interest II, supra note 11. See generally
Responses, THE PUBLIC INDEX, http://thepublicindex.org/documents/responses (last
visited Jan. 4, 2013) (collecting objections to the Authors Guild Settlement). In the fall of
2009, the parties withdrew the settlement and replaced it with an amended one that was
narrower in various ways. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2. This Article will
discuss only the terms of the amended settlement, except where the initial settlement’s
terms raise an issue particularly on point with the analysis.
55. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 1.52 (defining “Display Uses” to
include “Snippet Display”); id. § 1.147 (defining “Snippet Display” as “up to three (3)
‘snippets’ (each snippet being about three (3) to four (4) lines of text) per search term per
user”); id. 2.2 (authorizing Google to make “Display Uses”); id. § 3.1 (“Google may, on a
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would have paid $60 for each book that it had scanned, for a total of
at least $45 million. 56 Beyond that, the settlement would have
authorized some new major uses of the scanned books. Google would
have sold online access to individual e-books, 57 and also offered an
all-new all-you-can-read subscription service to libraries and other
institutions. 58 In addition, Google would have shown search users
previews of up to 20% of each book. 59 And finally, it would have
created a “Research Corpus” for large-scale computational analyses
of the texts by scholars. 60
Google would have kept 37% of the revenue; 61 the rest would
have been directed to a new Book Rights Registry for distribution to
copyright owners who stepped forward to claim their books. 62 Those
who did claim their books could choose whether to include them in
the various revenue-generating programs. 63 The procedures for
non-exclusive basis, Digitize all Books and Inserts obtained by Google from any source
. . . .”).
56. See id. § 5.1(a) (defining “Cash Payments” as at least $60 per book); id. § 5.1(b)
(requiring Google to contribute at least $45 million to fund Cash Payments); id.
Attachment C (providing “Plan of Allocation” for payments among copyright owners).
57. See id. § 4.2 (establishing Consumer Purchase program). Google’s eBookstore is
extremely similar to the proposed Consumer Purchase program under the settlement. See
Books
on
Google
Play,
GOOGLE
PLAY,
https://play.google.com/store
/books?feature=corpus_selector (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). The key difference is that books
in the eBookstore are there with the explicit opt-in permission of copyright owners,
whereas the settlement would have allowed Google to include books whose copyright
owners had not affirmatively opted out.
58. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 4.1 (establishing Institutional
Subscription program). Google would also have been permitted—although not required—
to give colleges and public libraries limited free access to the Institutional Subscription.
See id. § 4.8 (authorizing Public Access service).
59. See id. § 4.3 (establishing Preview Use program); id. § 3.14 (allowing advertising
on preview webpages).
60. See id. § 7.2(d); Brief for Digital Humanities and Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Defendant at 1–3, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y
Aug. 3, 2012), ECF No. 1055.
61. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 4.5(a) (setting revenue split to be
given to copyright owners at 70% of net revenues); id. §§ 1.89–1.90 (defining net revenues
to exclude 10% for Google’s operating costs).
62. See id. art. VI (establishing Registry and defining its duties, which also included
negotiating with Google over subscription pricing, auditing Google’s accounting, and
negotiating with Google the terms of three additional uses: print-on-demand,
downloadable copies (e.g. in PDF or EPUB format), and a subscription for individual
consumers).
63. Class action scholars refer to these options as “back-end opt-out rights” to
distinguish them from the right to opt out of the settlement itself. See, e.g., Nagareda,
Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options, supra note 9, at 758; Rhonda Wasserman, The Curious
Complications with Back-End Opt-Out Rights, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 383–84
(2007). They are options available within the settlement itself to class members who are
otherwise bound by its terms. See id. at 379. As with everything else in the Google Books
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dividing the money and control of a book between authors and
publishers were complex, requiring a separate sixteen-page
attachment. 64 Owners who did not claim their books would have been
represented by an Unclaimed Works Fiduciary within the Registry, 65
which would have held their money for at least ten years, then given it
to “literacy-based charities.” 66 The settlement was immensely
complicated; this overview describes only the terms directly relevant
to its class-action bona fides. 67
settlement, their details were complicated. The settlement let class members irrevocably
remove their books from being scanned at all, but only for a limited time. See Authors
Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 3.5(a). It also gave them the option to exclude their
books from being included in the revenue models or shown to users, an option they could
toggle on or off at any time. See id. § 3.5(b).
64. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, Attachment C.
65. See id. § 6.2(b)(iii). Notwithstanding the name, the settlement did not actually
require the Unclaimed Works Fiduciary to be vested with enforceable fiduciary duties. See
Letter from Institution for Information Law and Policy at 2, Authors Guild, No. 05 Civ.
8136, ECF No. 856. It was added to the settlement because of the conflict of interest
inherent in having copyright owners who had claimed their books sharing in revenue
meant for those who had not. See Statement of Interest I, supra note 54, at 9–10; James
Grimmelmann, The Google Book Search Settlement: Ends, Means, and the Future of
Books, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y (Apr. 15, 2009), https://www.acslaw.org
/sites/default/files/Grimmelman_Issue_Brief.pdf.
66. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 6.3(a).
67. For discussion of the copyright issues the settlement raised, see generally
Katharina de la Durantaye, H Is for Harmonization: The Google Book Search Settlement
and Orphan Works Legislation in the European Union, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 157 (2010)
(describing settlement’s role in advancing conversations about orphan works in the United
States and in the European Union); Bernard Lang, Orphan Works and the Google Book
Search Settlement: An International Perspective, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 111 (2010)
(assessing settlement against limitations imposed by copyright treaty system); Lateef
Mtima & Steven D. Jamar, Fulfilling the Copyright Social Justice Promise: Digitized
Textual Information, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 77 (2010) (arguing that Google’s digitization
of books advances the distributive goals of copyright law); Sag, supra note 47 (comparing
the settlement to the hypothetical results of litigation); Samuelson, supra note 13 (arguing
that the settlement could implement forms of copyright reform that Congress would likely
not be able to pass).
For antitrust discussion, see generally Einer Elhauge, Why the Google Books
Settlement Is Procompetitive, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2010) (arguing that the settlement is
legal under antitrust law); Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New
Orphan-Works Monopoly?, 5 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 383 (2009) (asserting that the opt-out
provision could raise antitrust concerns); Yuan Ji, Note, Why the Google Book Search
Settlement Should Be Approved: A Response to Antitrust Concerns and Suggestions for
Regulation, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 231 (2011) (concluding that the settlement would
not have granted exclusive orphan book access to Google or anticompetitive pricing
power to the Rightsholders); Christopher A. Suarez, Note, Continued DOJ Oversight of
the Google Book Search Settlement: Defending Our Public Values and Promoting
Competition, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 175 (2010) (arguing that the settlement fails antitrust
scrutiny).
On privacy issues, see generally Elisabeth A. Jones & Joseph W. Janes,
Anonymity in a World of Google Books: Google Books, Privacy, and the Freedom to Read,
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Returning to the settlement’s treatment of future conduct, the
operative clause read:
Without further action by anyone, as of the Effective Date, the
Rightsholder Releasors . . . shall be deemed to have, and by
operation of law and the Final Judgment and Order of
Dismissal shall have, fully, finally, and forever released,
relinquished, settled, and discharged (i) the Google Released
Claims . . . . 68
In turn, the settlement defined “Google Released Claims” as
each and every Claim of every Rightsholder that has been or
could have been asserted in the Action against any Google
Releasee (including all Claims of copyright infringement,
trademark infringement, or moral rights violation) that arises
out of
(A) any of the following actions taken on or before the
Effective Date . . . ,
(ii) any Google Releasee’s Digitization of such Books
and Inserts and any Google Releasee’s use of Digital
Copies of Books and Inserts for Google’s use in Google
Products and Services . . . ,
(B) after the Effective Date, any act or omission authorized
by this Amended Settlement Agreement . . . when that act
or omission is undertaken by a Person who is authorized to
undertake it under this Amended Settlement Agreement
. . . . 69
POL’Y & INTERNET, no. 4, 2010, at 43, http://www.psocommons.org/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=policyandinternet (teasing out the differences in
reader privacy protections between public libraries and Google Books); Kathleen E.
Kubis, Note, Google Books: Page by Page, Click by Click, Users Are Reading Away
Privacy Rights, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 217 (2010) (proposing a comprehensive
federal privacy statute).
For an overview of the relationships among these issues, see generally James
Grimmelmann, The Elephantine Google Books Settlement, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
497 (2011) (connecting antitrust, copyright, and class-action concerns); Grimmelmann, The
Google Book Search Settlement, supra note 65 (arguing that settlement raises significant
concerns in multiple areas).
68. Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 10.2(a).
69. Id. § 10.1(f) (indentation added to show structure). A “Rightsholder” was defined
as any person who owned a copyright in a book as of January 5, 2009. Id. §§ 1.13, 1.19,
1.134. Thus, class membership was closed as of a certain date, and the set of books to
which the settlement applied was also closed. In contrast, the set of claims released by
these class members with respect to these books was open-ended, because it included
future claims based on Google’s future conduct. Thus, the settlement reached future
conduct, but not future authors or future books. To understand the difference, contrast a
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This definition neatly split into two parts. Clause (A) covered
past conduct: it released claims arising out of Google’s actions before
the date the settlement was to take effect. 70 Clause (B) covered future
conduct: it released claims arising out of Google’s actions afterwards.
Thus, if Google digitized a book the day before the Effective Date, it
would have been past conduct shielded by clause (A); if Google
digitized a book the day after the Effective Date, it would have been
future conduct shielded by clause (B).
The two prongs, past and future, had very different scopes.
Clause (A) hewed closely to specific and identified actions that
Google had already undertaken: digitizing books, making a search
index, and showing snippets to search users. 71 But clause (B) was
much broader. It covered “any act or omission authorized” by the
settlement. 72 So to understand its scope, one must read the other
hundred and forty pages of the settlement. Those pages included
individual book sales, the subscription service, excerpts shown as free
previews to users, computational research, and everything else the
settlement allowed Google to do. 73 If the settlement had been
approved, then clause (A) would have resolved the underlying
lawsuit, while clause (B) would have gone further and authorized
Google’s universal bookstore.
When the court rejected the settlement in March 2011, this
distinction between past-conduct releases and future-conduct releases
was central to its reasoning:
book published in 2008 but not scanned by Google until 2108 with a book published and
scanned in 2010. The former would have been covered by the settlement, and the latter
would not.
It is unclear what effect the limiting phrase “every Claim . . . that . . . could have
been asserted” was intended to have. Claims arising out of the controversial parts of the
settlement—Google’s sales of complete books—could not have been asserted in the
lawsuit, because they were not ripe. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 11 CV
6351(HB), 2012 WL 4808939, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012) (holding that claims against
Google’s library partners for distributing complete books were not ripe because a “ ‘mere
possibility’ that one of Plaintiffs’ works might be included on a future list of orphan works
or made available is not enough” to create a ripe dispute). But the entire settlement was
premised on the assumption that it would indeed authorize the sale of complete books.
The most likely possibilities are that the parties did not appreciate that these futureconduct claims were unripe or that that the language of “claims that could have been
asserted” is such standard boilerplate in settlements that they were reluctant to tamper
with it. Neither possibility is reassuring about the competence of class counsel in future
cases to draft effectively tailored future-conduct releases; see also infra Part V.A
(discussing ripeness issues in litigation against Google and its library partners).
70. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 1.53 (defining “Effective Date”).
71. See id. § 10.1(f)(A).
72. See id. § 10.1(f)(B).
73. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
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The [settlement] can be divided into two distinct parts. The
first is a settlement of past conduct and would release Google
from liability for past copyright infringement. The second
would transfer to Google certain rights in exchange for future
and ongoing arrangements, including the sharing of future
proceeds, and it would release Google (and others) from
liability for certain future acts. 74
According to the court, the future-conduct releases were
impermissible: “this second part of the [settlement] contemplates an
arrangement that exceeds what the Court may permit under Rule
23.” 75
B.

Defining Future-Conduct Releases

There are three features of this example worth emphasizing:
• The settlement used releases.
• The releases applied to future conduct.
• The releases were given by the class.
The next three sections consider each of these features in turn.
1. Releases for Future Conduct Given by a Class
Every settlement includes at least two kinds of terms: the releases
of legal claims given by the plaintiff, and the relief it obtains in return.
Typically, a plaintiff has nothing to fear from the relief—these terms
can only benefit it. Thus, even though the Google Books settlement
would have created a $34.5 million Book Rights Registry and given it
numerous responsibilities, these were not reasons to be concerned. 76
Even relief involving far-off future action on the defendant’s part is
common. Class-action settlements regularly establish claimprocessing facilities, fund educational programs, or even provide
medical services to class members. 77 Extinguishing asbestos claims in
74. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
75. Id. at 677. For the history of the lawsuit following the settlement’s rejection, see
infra Part V.A.
76. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 2.1(c) (obligating Google to fund
the Registry with an initial $34.5 million and summarizing its responsibilities).
77. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1203, No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275, at *69–72, *79–82
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (approving settlement creating a trust to pay class members’
claims, providing free echocardiograms for class members, and establishing a $25 million
fund for heart-disease medical research and education). The Diet Drugs fund, approved in
2000, is still open. See generally AHP DIET DRUGS SETTLEMENT, http://
www.settlementdietdrugs.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (providing information about Diet
Drugs fund for class members).
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bankruptcy requires the creation of a trust that may need to be kept
open for decades. 78
Rather, it is the releases given by class members that make a
settlement dangerous to them. 79 (The same is true in individual
settlements: a party is at risk because of what it gives up, not because
of what it gets.) But because it is a release that makes a settlement a
settlement, the mere fact that a settlement contains releases is not a
reason to reject it. Every settlement does. The objectors who called
the Google Books settlement a “commercial transaction” were wide
of the mark. 80 As William Rubenstein has observed, much of modern

78. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006) (permitting a bankruptcy court approving a plan of
reorganization in Chapter 11 to issue an injunction preventing future claims against a
debtor “seeking recovery for damages allegedly caused by the presence of, or exposure to,
asbestos or asbestos-containing products,” but only if the plan also establishes and funds a
trust that “will value, and be in a financial position to pay, present claims and future
demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner”). Section 524(g),
the so-called “Manville Amendment,” was enacted in 1994 to bless and codify the
procedure followed in the six-year journey through bankruptcy of the Johns-Manville
Corporation. See generally Mark D. Plevin et. al., The Future Claims Representative in
Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: Conflicts of Interest, Strange Alliances, and
Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Clients, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 271,
278–80 (2006) (providing an overview of how § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code deals with
future claims in asbestos-related litigation). The original Manville Trust, established in
1988, is still open. See Financial Statements and Report of Manville Personal Injury Trust
for the Period Ending March 31, 2011, In re Johns-Manville Corporation, No. 82 B 11656
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2011), available at http://www.mantrust.org/FTP/2011FirstQ.pdf
(reporting $1.06 billion in assets and over 20,000 open claims).
79. This Article focuses on releases because they are the most common kinds of
concessions given by a plaintiff class. But this focus should not be taken to imply that
other forms of concessions are harmless. When a class promises to pay money, or concedes
liability, or makes promises, these terms also expose the class to harm. Indeed, there have
been notorious abuses in which class members found themselves out of pocket at the end
of the day. See, e.g., Kamilewicz v. Bank of Bos. Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 508–09 (7th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to allow collateral attack on a class-action settlement that obligated class
members to pay attorneys’ fees in excess of their recoveries). The case drew a strong
dissent. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1349–53 (7th Cir.
1996) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). But these other
devices have generally been recognized as dangerous, and subjected to blistering criticism.
See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV.
1051, 1067–68 (1996) (criticizing underlying settlement in Kamilewicz). This Article seeks
to bring the same kind of sunlight to future-conduct releases.
80. See Objection of Scott E. Gant to Proposed Settlement, and to Certification of the
Proposed Settlement Class and Sub-Classes at 5, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F.
Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136), ECF No. 141 (“commercial transaction”);
Objection of Amazon.com, Inc., to Proposed Amended Settlement at 1, Authors Guild,
770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136), ECF No. 823 (“business arrangement”); Objections
of Microsoft Corp. to proposed Settlement and Certification of Proposed Settlement Class
and Sub-Classes at 22, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 CV 8136), ECF No. 276
(“business deal”).
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class-action practice is transactional. 81 Class members sell their claims
to the defendant in exchange for payment. The defendant wants to
purchase finality, and the settlement process is simply an extended
negotiation over the terms of the deal. The defendant might promise
to change its behavior, or to pay class members money, or to
undertake other obligations to make their lives better. The question
for the court is whether they receive sufficient compensation for the
releases they give. 82
2. Releases for Future Conduct Given by a Class
There are two distinctions about future-conduct releases worth
making: between future conduct and past conduct, and between
future conduct and future claims. Both can be illustrated with the
hypothetical Warhol Soup example. Suppose that Batch 15M-1928,
made and sold in 2010, was tainted with pathogenic E. coli. Contrast
three possible settlements of a resulting class-action lawsuit:
• Consumers who have gotten sick from Batch 15M-1928 release
their claims against Warhol in exchange for $50 payments. This
is a settlement of present claims arising out of past conduct.
Consumers who get sick in 2015 can still sue.
• Consumers who have gotten sick will get sick from Batch 15M1928 release their claims against Warhol in exchange for $50
payments. This is a settlement of future claims arising out of
past conduct. Consumers who get sick in 2015 from the delayed
consequences of eating soup from Batch 15M-1928 cannot sue
and must be content with the fixed $50 payments instead.
Those who get sick in 2015 from eating other batches made in
later years can sue.
• Consumers who have gotten sick will get sick from Batch 15M1928 future batches of Fifteen Minutes of Tomato release their
claims against Warhol in exchange for $50 payments. This is a
settlement of future claims arising out of future conduct.
Consumers who get sick in 2015 cannot sue and must be
content with the fixed $50 payments instead, no matter when
the soup they ate was made.

81. See William Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
372–73 (2001).
82. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (permitting approval of settlement only on a judicial
finding that it “fair, reasonable, and adequate”).
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Past-conduct releases are almost completely at the discretion of
the party giving the release. Not so with future-conduct releases:
sometimes, public policy prohibits them. So, for example, the
Supreme Court has held that “there can be no prospective waiver of
an employee’s rights under Title VII.” 83 Of course, this limit applies
also to settlements; if it did not, the civil rights laws could be evaded
by the “settlement” of a collusive lawsuit. 84
This substantive rule against future-conduct releases is not
universal: some areas of law have it, others do not. The key
question—albeit one that is not made explicit in the case law—
appears to be whether the area of law has a public policy against
private ordering. Anti-discrimination law obviously does: even if a
particular individual were willing to be subjected to invidious
discrimination, it would still be against public policy because it would
83. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
84. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 854 (5th Cir.
1975) (“Clearly apart from compliance or noncompliance with the decrees, the release
cannot preclude a suit for any form of appropriate relief for subsequent injuries caused by
future acts or undertakings the effects of which are equivalent to the otherwise
compromised, noncompensable effects of past discriminations covered by the complaint or
the decrees.”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2006) (allowing knowing and voluntary
waivers of age discrimination claims); id. § 626 (f)(1)(C) (prohibiting waivers of age
discrimination claims “that may arise after the date the waiver is executed”).
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tend to lock in a system of subordination and stereotyping that would
harm others. So does antitrust law: its raison d’être is to prohibit
forms of private ordering that have serious negative effects for
competition and consumers. 85
Other areas of law do not have a substantive policy against
future-conduct releases. Copyright law depends on voluntary
licensing to compensate authors and get works to the public; 86 a rule
against future-conduct releases would make prospective licensing
harder or impossible, to the great detriment of authors, publishers,
and readers. 87 Sometimes the analysis requires more detailed factual
attention, as with the rule against prospective waivers of liability for
harm caused negligently by “one charged with a duty of public
service,” such as a doctor. 88
Although these public-policy limits sometimes emerge in class
actions, they stem from the substantive law, not from the class-action
form. A good example is Williams v. Vukovich, 89 a case involving
racial discrimination by the Youngstown police department. 90 The
court rejected a proposed consent decree 91 that would have “waive[d]
85. See, e.g., Three Rivers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 522 F.2d 885, 896 n.27 (3d
Cir. 1975) (stating that a release may not “waive damages from future violations of
antitrust laws” and citing cases).
86. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (distinguishing “transfer of copyright ownership”
from a “nonexclusive license”); id. §§ 112(e)(2) (exempting voluntary license negotiations
over certain ephemeral recordings from the antitrust laws); id. § 205(e) (establishing
priority as between nonexclusive licenses and transfers).
87. See Transcript of Fairness Hearing at 143, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05
Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2010) (argument of Daralyn Durie on behalf of Google)
(“That’s because discrimination is evil. The dissemination of copyrighted works is not.
That is because the purpose of the Copyright Act is to encourage the production of
copyrighted works.”).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981). This example reflects a
balance between a general backdrop of freedom of contract and more specific oversight of
the regulated professions. See id. cmt. a.
89. 720 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1983).
90. See id. at 912; see also Transcript of Fairness Hearing, supra note 87, at 48–49
(argument of David Nimmer on behalf of Amazon.com, invoking Vukovich).
91. A consent decree is “an agreement between the parties to end a lawsuit on
mutually acceptable terms which the judge agrees to enforce as a judgment.” Larry
Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 325
(1988). It differs from an ordinary civil settlement in that the court retains jurisdiction to
enforce the agreement’s terms: the parties “can resolve disputes [about the settlement’s
terms] and get enforcement without filing a new suit and starting at the end of the queue.”
Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Consent in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
19, 20 (1987). It may be modified or vacated by the court due to changed circumstances.
See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378–81 (1992).
Class-action settlements and consent decrees overlap. A class-action settlement
may include provisions providing for ongoing relief; when it does, the agreement is both a
class-action settlement and a consent decree. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n. of
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the ability of minorities to complain about discrimination which may
occur in the future” by allowing the Youngstown police department
to use a new examination system even if it had discriminatory
impact. 92 The court held that a “waiver of future discrimination is
impermissible”: a rule that is specific to civil rights law, but not to
class actions. 93
3. Releases for Future Conduct Given by a Class
Releases by classes are categorically different than releases by
individuals. 94 The legal system already leaves individuals to make
their bargains, for good or for ill. Ordinary contracts are full of

Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1986). And like class-action
settlements, consent decrees require judicial approval. See id. at 525 (“[A] consent decree
must spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject-matter
jurisdiction.”); Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Emp. Dept. v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961)
(“The parties cannot, by giving each other consideration, purchase from a court of equity a
continuing injunction. . . . [T]he District Court's authority to adopt a consent decree comes
only from the statute which the decree is intended to enforce. . . . [T]he adopting court is
free to reject agreed-upon terms as not in furtherance of statutory objectives . . . .”). See
generally Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29
B.C. L. REV. 291 (1988) (discussing contract and judicial decree paradigms of consent
decrees).
Still, it is important to distinguish the different kinds of terms that may appear in a
settlement. The essential aspect of a consent decree is that it is a decree: it invokes the
court’s equitable powers, functions as injunctive relief, and can be enforced by holding the
violator in contempt of court. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 439–40 (5th
Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Whether a class-action settlement includes any such provisions is
independent of the scope of the releases it contains. See generally DOUG RENDLEMAN,
COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 399–
401 (2010) (discussing the theoretical and practical aspects of consent decrees).
92. Vukovich, 720 F.2d at 926.
93. Id.
94. This Article discusses only class actions, rather than other forms of nonclass
aggregation, such as shared representation, coordinated pretrial processing, and mass
arbitration. There are two reasons. First, a proper treatment of nonclass aggregation
would greatly expand the scope of the Article. Second, the Article is principally concerned
with the unjustified use of judicial power to impose terms on class members, a concern
that plays out very differently when the aggregation shapes class members’ rights and
options less directly. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in
NonClass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2009) (developing theory of
procedural justice for nonclass aggregation that draws on class-action scholarship);
Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000) (developing
theory of professional ethics for nonclass aggregation that draws on class-action
scholarship); Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 1105 (2010) (identifying situations raising aggregate-litigation
concerns); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion,
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011) (describing
common aggregation problems in class actions and nonclass litigation).
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releases for present and future claims based on past and future
conduct, as in the warranties section of a contract for the sale of
services. The same autonomy principle that lets Adam sign a contract
hiring Steve to cut down trees on Adam’s land also lets Adam release
Steve from liability for trespass and conversion when Steve cuts them
down. If Adam wants to give Steve those releases as part of a
settlement of an active lawsuit, the legal system will let him: it has
already conceded the general principle.
But class litigation is inherently representational, and that
changes matters. 95 Here, there is no contractual parallel: we do not
ordinarily allow lawyers to go around signing contracts on behalf of
large classes of individuals. Instead, the only way to obtain a release
from a class is in a settlement—that is, by invoking the court’s power
to impose a settlement on absent members of the class. 96 This
requires justification in a way that individual releases do not. We let
individuals make improvident decisions on their own behalf; but we
try not to let class counsel make improvident decisions on behalf of
class members.
What matters is the character of the release, not the character of
the lawsuit. The fact that an individual gives a promise to a class as
part of a class-action settlement is of no moment. It is still
fundamentally an individual promise, and does not raise the
representational concerns that releases given by a class do.
Cases sometimes speak broadly about class-action settlements
that “provide[] broader relief than the court could have awarded after
a trial.” 97 Uniformly, however, these cases deal with broad relief given
95. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) (discussing history of representative litigation);
Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of
Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990) (reviewing YEAZELL) (same);
Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate
Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577 (2011) (challenging
contemporary theories of representation).
96. This is the defining feature of representational litigation—that the judgment will
be binding on “absent” class members who were not before the court. See, e.g., Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921) (“If the federal courts are to have
the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are obviously entitled, the decree when
rendered must bind all of the class properly represented.”). Articles with useful discussion
of representation in class actions include Bone, The Puzzling Idea, supra note 95, at 577;
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., John L. Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the
Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1857 (1998); Richard A. Nagareda,
The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149,
224 (2003).
97. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 185 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting
Local No. 93, Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986)).
THE
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to the class rather than with broad releases given by the class. For
example, in Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v.
Cleveland, 98 minority firefighters sued Cleveland for racial
discrimination. 99 The city agreed to a consent decree that reserved
some promotions for minorities. 100 A group of white firefighters
intervened and objected to the consent decree, alleging that it went
beyond the lawsuit by giving promotions to minorities who had not
themselves been the victims of racial discrimination. 101 The Supreme
Court upheld the consent decree, explaining:
However, in addition to the law which forms the basis of the
claim, the parties’ consent animates the legal force of a consent
decree. Therefore, a federal court is not necessarily barred from
entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides
broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial. 102
The allegedly problematic relief in Firefighters was a promise
made by the individual party (Cleveland) and not the class (the
minority firefighters). And while the white firefighters may have
disagreed with the consent decree, they were not parties who would
be bound by its releases. 103 Their problem was that they had no legal
right to stop Cleveland’s new promotion plan, not that they might
have had such a right and were being forced to trade it away.
Firefighters simply has nothing to say about the permissible scope of
releases given by the class in a Rule 23(e) review: it speaks of “relief”
to the plaintiffs, not the “releases” given by the plaintiffs. 104 This is
why the cases offering “detailed structural arrangements addressing
matters well beyond the generalized allegations of the complaint” are
simply not relevant to future-conduct releases by a class. 105 Similarly,
the recent ALI Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation state,
“Class actions may also be settled on terms that may include remedies

98. 478 U.S. 501, 504 (1986).
99. Id. at 504.
100. Id. at 507–08.
101. Id. at 507, 511.
102. Id. at 525 (internal citations omitted).
103. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989).
104. See Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 504. The Authors Guild court therefore erred when it
accepted the parties’ arguments that the Firefighters test governed. See Authors Guild v.
Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 675 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). It compensated for that error,
however, by concluding that the test was not satisfied, writing that “that the released
claims would not come within ‘the general scope of the case made by the pleadings.’ ” Id.
at 679 (quoting Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525).
105. Brief of Google in Support, supra note 36, at 9 (listing cases).
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not available in contested lawsuits . . . .” 106 The choice of wording is
significant: the court may award “remedies” not available through
litigation, not “releases.”
***
Standing alone, none of these three features is novel. Courts and
scholars understand clearly the differences between promises and
releases, between past conduct and future conduct, and between
individual and class litigation. Even in pairs, they are all old hat. It is
only the combination of the three that is unfamiliar: releases for a
defendant’s future conduct by a class.
II. PROBLEMS WITH FUTURE-CONDUCT RELEASES
It is well understood that class-action settlements are dangerous
to class members. The attorney-directed nature of class litigation
creates structural incentives for class counsel to be disloyal to their
“clients” in the class. 107 The settlement negotiations feature the
defendant on one side and class counsel on the other. The defendant
would like to purchase “global peace” from the class and is prepared
to pay for it. The broader the releases, the more it will pay. Class
counsel, for their part, are paid in proportion to the size of the deal.
This common interest naturally pushes toward settlements with the
106. THE AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
§ 3.01(a) (2010).
107. See, e.g., LESTER BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY
FEES REALLY COST AMERICA 335–73 (2011) (discussing the abuse of contingency fees in
class actions); Coffee, supra note 9, at 1367–84 (describing incentives for class counsel in
the mass tort context and the resulting danger of collusion with the defendant); Koniak,
supra note 9, at 1051–86 (describing in detail the problematic terms in one settlement); cf.
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 (1999) (“Class counsel thus had great
incentive to reach any agreement in the global settlement negotiations that they thought
might survive a Rule 23(e) fairness hearing, rather than the best possible arrangement for
the substantially unidentified global settlement class.”). For a discussion of possible
responses to this problem, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370
(2000) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Action Accountability] (arguing that problems of
collusion could be avoided by promoting client autonomy rather than class cohesion);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 288 (2010) (extending argument of Class Action Accountability with evidence and
models from European practice); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and
“Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1377 (2000) (arguing that problems of abusive class actions can be solved without
abandoning the device); Issacharoff, supra note 9 (discussing class governance mechanisms
to temper the risks of ineffective or disloyal class counsel); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental
Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65 (2003) (same); William B.
Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1435 (2006) (same); Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 9 (same).
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broadest possible releases. Meanwhile, both defendant and class
counsel would rather sign off on a settlement that pays class counsel a
little than one that pays class members a lot. This leads to settlements
that “pay” for broad releases in coin that does not really benefit class
members, such as coupons worth less than their nominal value, “cy
pres” awards to unrelated charities, side payments to the attorneys’
individual clients outside of the settlement, and better relief for some
class members than for others. The possibility, nay probability, of
collusive sweetheart settlements drives the Rule 23(e)(2) requirement
that courts approve only those settlements that are “fair, reasonable,
and adequate.” 108
With this backdrop in mind, this Part will compare futureconduct settlements to their past-conduct siblings. The baseline for
the comparison will be a run-of-the-mill settlement of a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action for money damages, 109 as in the first (past conduct, past
108. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
109. This choice could be challenged on two grounds. First, it takes a plaintiff class
action as the baseline, although Rule 23 explicitly permits a class to “sue or be sued.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(a). Defendant class actions are “rare as unicorns,” and with good reason.
Coffee, Class Action Accountability, supra note 107 at 388. Because a defendant class (or a
plaintiff class facing counterclaims) risks actual liability, not just the loss of a right to sue, it
presents the higher-stakes concerns discussed in infra Part II.A. And there have been
notorious abuses of defendant class-actions due to the practical difficulty of finding
appropriate class representatives and financing their work. See, e.g., Richardson v. Kelly,
191 S.W.2d 857, 864 (Tex. 1946) (refusing to allow collateral attack on a judgment in a
defendant class action where the plaintiff had hand-picked representative defendants to
avoid those who were likely to seriously contest the suit). Richardson involved a case
litigated to judgment rather than settled, but it illustrates well the mischief that is possible
when class representatives can obligate class members to make payments. See
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 239–42 (1950) (criticizing
Richardson); Russell P. Duncan, Note, Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Duty: W.R.
Grace & Co. v. CAB, 55 YALE L.J. 831, 836 (1946) (calling Richardson “unfair”); Harold
Hoffman, Comment, Denial of Due Process Through Use of the Class Action, 25 TEX. L.
REV. 64 passim (1946) (discussing Richardson). For these reasons, “stricter due process
considerations put greater limits on the use of defendant classes than plaintiff classes.” 2
ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:48 (4th ed.
2011). Thus, courts have already responded to the ways in which defendant class actions
deviate from the plaintiff-class baseline by imposing additional safeguards, confirming that
the plaintiff-class baseline is the appropriate one.
Second, the Article takes a rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class as its baseline, rather than a
mandatory class under subsections (b)(1) or (b)(2). Here the choice is primarily one of
expository simplicity. The claims that could be extinguished and the issues that could be
resolved in a mandatory class action do not exceed those at stake in a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action. The prerequisites to the mandatory class actions do not create new opportunities
for abuse, and the question of notice and opt-out rights is for the most part independent of
the question of future conduct. The one exception is that Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985) creates a link between opt-out rights and the risks a class faces in
litigation. See also infra Part III (discussing Shutts).
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claims) and second (past conduct, future claims) versions of the
Warhol Soup hypothetical. 110 The risks of future-conduct releases to
class members are substantially greater than the risks of past-conduct
releases, so that they require correspondingly greater scrutiny by
courts. These heightened risks are driven by the basic asymmetry
between past and future. The past can be known but not changed,
whereas the future can be changed but not known. Thus, the
consequences of future-conduct releases will tend to be both more
far-reaching and harder to predict.
It is worth exploring just how it is that releases can be so
uniquely creative. A promise not to sue is effectively a grant of
permission, which in turn gives the released party freedom of action.
Consider the Google Books settlement, and ask how it is that a oneparagraph release could bring a universal bookstore into being.
Without the releases, the settlement’s principal programs—selling
complete copies of books—would have been open-and-shut copyright
infringement. This is how the settlement works: delete clause (B)
from the definition of Google Released Claims and Google would
lack the legal cover it needs. True, the settlement also obligated
Google to fund and launch the bookstore, but the bookstore would
have been legally possible only by virtue of the releases given by class
members. 111
It should be clear that one can do a remarkable amount with
appropriately drafted releases. Here are a few more ambitious
possibilities:
Alternative Tort Compensation: Following the Deepwater
Horizon explosion, BP voluntarily created the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility (GCCF); those injured by the oil spill could make claims by
giving up their right to sue. 112 But with future-conduct releases and a

110. See supra Part I.B.2.
111. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, §§ 2.1(c), 10.1(b). Even more
dramatically, the authors and publishers would have been required to give extensive
releases to each other, the effect of which would have been to allocate the revenues from
any given book among possible claimants in a way that need not track the original
contract, and then to channel them into a mandatory arbitration program for resolving any
disputes. See id. art. IX (requiring arbitration) & Attachment A (establishing authorpublisher procedures); Objections of Science Fiction & Fantasy Writers of America, Inc.,
& American Society of Journalists & Authors, Inc., to the Amended Settlement
Agreement at 16–22, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(No. 1:05-cv-08136-DC), ECF No. 864.
112. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims
Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819,
825 (2011) (“[I]t is difficult to discern any basis for legitimacy for the GCCF. For those
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little forethought, BP could have achieved the same results far more
cheaply. Suppose that following an earlier, minor spill, BP had faced a
class-action lawsuit on behalf of all residents of the Gulf States. Then
suppose it had settled that lawsuit with a future-conduct release
shielding it from liability for any future spills, in exchange for
establishing a $1 billion compensation fund, against which all future
claims must be directed. 113
Land Assembly: A developer wishing to build a skyscraper on a
currently occupied city block brings a quiet title suit against a class of
all the landowners on the block. The class representative and
developer then negotiate a mandatory, non-opt-out settlement that
will pay each class member 105% of the appraised value of her land
in exchange for a release of any right to sue the developer for its
actions in knocking down the current buildings on the block, erecting
the skyscraper, and operating it for the next seventy-five years. This is
privatized eminent domain via class-action settlement.
Health Care Reform: A class of policyholders sues all the major
healthcare insurers in the United States, alleging a conspiracy to fix
prices. Over time, the settlement negotiations metastasize, and what
emerges is a proposed settlement that comprehensively establishes
new rules on reimbursement limits, acceptable grounds for rescission,
claims processing procedures, choice of doctors, and so on. The
insurers agree to these new terms; the policyholders agree to give up
all future claims except for violation of the new terms. This is the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, but accomplished
through a class-action settlement. 114
These hypothetical settlements are problematic in ways that go
beyond their use of future-conduct releases. The oil-spill settlement,
for example, raises serious commonality issues in lumping together
victims injured in different ways by different spills. The land assembly
settlement might be considered fundamentally unfair because it
coerces a sale. And the health-care reform settlement calls into the
question the ability of the named plaintiffs to represent such a
concerned with the rule of law, equity, and fundamental fairness, the GCCF ought to be a
cause for concern.”).
113. This amount, while large enough to seem plausible ex ante, would have been
grossly inadequate ex post. GCCF actually paid out over two billion dollars. See GULF
COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, OVERALL PROGRAM STATISTICS 4 (Oct. 7, 2011), http://
web.archive.org/web/20101216023532/http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/GCCF_Overall_St
atus_Report.pdf.
114. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (“PPACA”) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). This
hypothetical was suggested by Susan Koniak.
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sprawling class on such a wide range of matters. One hopes that a
court would be sensitive to these issues. But the fact that these
hypothetical future-conduct settlements make even the most
ambitious (and ethically problematic) actual class-action settlements
look downright reasonable in comparison should be setting off
alarms.
The rest of this Part will explore the specific dangers posed by
future-conduct releases. To summarize: there is more at stake in
future-conduct releases, they are harder to understand, they create
unique design problems, the aggregation of rights is itself dangerous,
and courts are the wrong institutions to be making such decisions.
A. High Stakes
In the past-conduct version of the Warhol Soup settlement, the
soup has already been manufactured, sold, and eaten. This is both bad
news and good news for consumers. The bad news is that the legal
system cannot keep them from getting sick; the good news is that the
legal system cannot make them any sicker. The status quo is that they
have been injured and have not yet been compensated. In the best
case they will be fully compensated and in the worst case they will
not—but only compensation is at risk, not the extent of their injuries.
While past-conduct releases are limited by past harms, futureconduct releases raise the stakes to include future harms as well.
These harms need never happen. If the soup settlement releases
Warhol Soup from liability for future batches of soup, many more
people may get sick than if the settlement is silent on future conduct
or if Warhol agrees never to sell it again. A past-conduct settlement
of the Google Books case would cover eight years; a future-conduct
settlement would run for over a hundred. The breathtaking ambition
of the hypothetical oil-spill, skyscraper, and health-care settlements is
possible only because of their use of future-conduct releases.
Put another way, the potential outcomes can display much higher
variance when class-action settlements can include future-conduct
releases, and some outcomes are much more negative for class
members. At least with a past-conduct settlement, the outcomes are
bounded below by the status quo; not so with a future-conduct
settlement. Higher variance, of course, need not imply lower expected
returns. If class members are fully compensated for the increased risk
of harm they bear, a settlement containing future-conduct releases
could in theory be good for them. Unfortunately, there are also good
reasons to believe that courts will systematically get many of these
decisions wrong.
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Uncertainty

As the saying goes, it’s tough to make predictions, especially
about the future. Future-conduct releases by their very nature require
predictions. The attorneys drafting the settlement, the class members
considering whether to opt out or object to it, and the court deciding
whether to approve it all must do so from a position of ignorance
about what will happen. That is, the procedural posture of a
settlement containing future-conduct releases inherently creates
informational problems.
Of course, even past-conduct settlements can depend on
predictions. This is why the future-claims cases are so vexing.
Knowing whether a settlement will be fair to someone who might or
might not develop cancer is much harder than knowing whether that
settlement is fair to someone who has developed cancer. 115 Seemingly
“comprehensive” settlements in mass-tort cases have unraveled
badly: initial estimates about the ultimate number and extent of class
members’ injuries have frequently proven to be far too optimistic. 116
Future-conduct settlements take these informational problems to
an entirely different level. The court must now predict the
consequences not of events that have already happened, but of events
that have yet to happen. These are predictions about the results of
predicted conduct: predictions on stilts. The defendant’s conduct
becomes a new moving part. Each option to act in one way or another
creates a new set of possible outcomes the court must analyze; as the
number of independent decisions the defendant is allowed increases,
the number of outcomes increases exponentially. The more complex
the settlement, the more the possible futures will diverge in subtle
and hard-to-predict ways. Courts are spectacularly badly positioned
to carry out the necessary analysis. In the words of Samuel Issacharoff
on class-action settlements, “Perhaps in no other context do we find
courts entering binding decrees with such a complete lack of access to

115. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (discussing
difficulty of giving adequate notice “to legions so unselfconscious”); Hazard, supra note 9,
at 1910 (discussing intractability of “unknown claims on the part of unknown claimants”).
116. See, e.g., RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT
111–13 (2007) (describing the unraveling of Owens-Corning asbestos settlement program);
id. at 143–48 (describing unraveling of fen-phen settlement); Frank J. Macchiarola, The
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDOZO L. REV.
583, 601–05 (1996) (describing the unraveling of the Johns-Manville asbestos trust).
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quality information and so completely dependent on the parties who
have the most to gain from favorable court action.” 117
For example, one of the least knowable questions about the
Google Books settlement was also one of the most important: how
the books would be priced. For individual book sales, Google pledged
to develop an algorithm that would set a profit-maximizing price for
each book. 118 But the algorithm itself was not in existence: it was
specified only by a few vague and mutually inconsistent phrases in the
settlement. 119 Similarly, the subscription service was to be priced to
meet two objectives in significant tension: “revenue at market rates”
for copyright owners and “broad access” for the public. 120 Under such
circumstances, it was impossible to make any reliable predictions
about how books would be priced if the settlement went into effect—
and yet such predictions were key to answering such basic questions
as whether the settlement would bring in enough money to make the
Registry sustainable, whether the subscription’s pricing would
unreasonably put the squeeze on libraries, and whether the
coordinated pricing would amount to an anti-competitive price-fixing
scheme.

117. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 808
(1997); cf. Schuck, supra note 9, at 973 (calling adjudication a “poorly informed
decisionmaking process” with limited “policy coherence and general applicability”).
118. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 4.2(b)(i)(2) (indicating that the
price is to be determined by an algorithm “that Google will design to find the optimal
price for each such Book”); id. § 4.2(c)(i) (specifying price points). Here is the
specification of the algorithm itself:
The Pricing Algorithm shall base the Settlement Controlled Price of a Book, on an
individual Book by Book basis, upon aggregate data collected with respect to
Books that are similar to such Book and will be designed to operate in a manner
that simulates how an individual Book would be priced by a Rightsholder of that
Book acting in a manner to optimize revenues in respect of such Book in a
competitive market, that is, assuming no change in the price of any other Book.
Id. § 4.2(c)(ii)(2); see also Elhauge, supra note 67, at 37–38 (admitting that the original
settlement’s specification was ambiguous and giving interpretation of amended
settlement’s specification).
119. See Letter from Institution for Information Law and Policy, supra note 65, at 5
(noting contradiction between settlement’s mandate to find the individually optimal price
for each book and its specification of the initial distribution of prices).
120. Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 4.1(a)(i); see also Academic Author
Objections to the Google Book Search Settlement at 3–5, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.,
770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 1:05-cv-08136-DC), ECF No. 336 [hereinafter
Academic Author Objections] (expressing concern about lack of constraints on
subscription pricing and describing pricing oversight procedures as “byzantine, even
Kafkaesque”).
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Similarly, unpredictability is one of the significant problems in
the health-care hypothetical. The U.S. health-care compensation
system is already so intricate that it displays unexpected emergent
behavior, and no one has more than a general idea of what
consequences the Affordable Care Act will bring. If the Act were a
settlement, would it be “fair, reasonable, and adequate” to patients?
Are you sure?
C.

Moral Hazard

Future-conduct releases are also hard to get right because the
future can be changed. A badly designed future-conduct release can
create perverse incentives. Releasing a past-conduct claim affects only
the price the defendant must pay ex post for its alleged breach of
duty. But to release future-conduct claims is to tamper with
incentives. By displacing the potential liability the defendant would
otherwise face, a settlement can leave the defendant with less ex ante
reason to care about harms it could still prevent. Some such issues
will arise in any settlement with forward-looking terms, but with
future-conduct releases, the moral hazard can infect the defendant’s
primary conduct, not just the compensation.
In theoretical terms, scholars worry about calibrating the
deterrent effect of class actions: defendants (primarily companies)
will vary their level of risky activities in light of the expected liability
they face from class actions. 121 For class actions over past conduct, this
121. The leading deterrence theorist is David Rosenberg. See generally Rosenberg,
supra note 9 (arguing that an insurance fund model of class action judgment incorporates
both deterrent and insurance functions of mass tort liability); David Rosenberg,
Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 831 (2002) (arguing that mandatory class action litigation is the only means of
effective deterrence); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have
and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 395 (2000) (“[D]ifferential access to the
scale economies from class-wide litigation undermines the primary goals of tort law:
effective and administratively efficient deterrence . . . .”); David Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 849 (1984) (arguing that preclusion of mass tort claims frustrates the deterrence
goal of the tort system). But he is hardly alone in emphasizing the deterrence function.
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits,
51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1309–12 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class
Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536
(2006); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and
Conflicts of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 49 (1975); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman,
Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial
Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 106 (2006); Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination:
The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 1249, 1312–17 (2003); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification
and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1417 (2003). The approach has a long history. See
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is a form of general deterrence: it aims to ensure that other potential
defendants in similar situations will take adequate precautions. When
future-conduct releases are involved, however, one must also worry
about specific deterrence because the settlement will directly affect
this particular defendant’s incentives going forward. 122 This is a more
complicated challenge, and harder to get right.
This is of course the principal danger in the oil-spill
hypothetical. 123 If the terms of the compensation fund are not
properly calibrated, then BP may find it profitable to take fewer
precautions than would be socially optimal, or than the tort system
would have required. Indeed, if the fund is established with a onetime payment, it will give the company no incentive at all to care
about future safety!
The Google Books settlement also illustrates the challenges
involved. The pricing and auditing provisions were both vague and
complex. 124 It was not immediately obvious what Google’s pricing
incentives were, or what the Registry’s incentives to monitor Google
were. If the prices had been set too high, Google could have been the
agent of a conspiracy in restraint of trade. 125 If the prices had been set
too low, Google could have flooded the market with cheap copies and
destroyed the books’ future value to copyright owners. 126 Similarly,
there was a telling mistake in the original settlement’s protections for
owners of unclaimed works. The settlement reallocated some of the
unclaimed funds to copyright owners who did claim their books,

Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 714 (1940).
122. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (discussing
broadly the roles of specific and general deterrence in accident law). This use of the terms
is consistent with Calabresi’s distinction between directly prohibiting particular acts
(specific deterrence) and putting costs on those whose activities cause them (general
deterrence). See id. at 68–77. It is also consistent with the usual criminal-law senses of the
terms: specific deterrence targets the individual, general deterrence targets others in the
same shoes.
123. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
124. The pricing provisions have already been discussed. On the auditing provisions,
see Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, §§ 4.2(c)(ii)(3), 4.2(c)(iii), 4.6(e).
125. See Suarez, supra note 67, at 190–213 (arguing that there is a risk of
anticompetitive pricing); Academic Author Objections, supra note 120, at 3 (discussing
risks of “price-gouging”). But see Elhauge, supra note 67, passim (arguing in detail that
Google’s incentives would have been socially optimal and that copyright owners
themselves would have monitored it).
126. Cf. Letter from Institution for Information Law and Policy, supra note 65, at 3
(noting lack of oversight for underpriced unclaimed books).
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giving the claiming owners an incentive to pressure the Registry not
to be diligent in searching out owners of unclaimed works. 127
D. Concentrated Power
The defining feature of class-wide future-conduct releases is that
they give the defendant prospective freedom to act in a way that
affects large numbers of class members at once. 128 This is a form of
power, and it can sometimes be turned around against class members.
For example, concentrated power is the great danger in the
healthcare reform settlement hypothetical. The settlement could
provide the legal cover to cartelize the defendant insurers, freeing
them from public oversight and market discipline. 129 Patient class
members could end up being practically helpless against the
negotiating power of the new settlement-produced insurer cartel:

127. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, § 6.3(a) (providing for allocation of
unclaimed funds); Statement of Interest I, supra note 54, at 9 (criticizing allocation); Brief
of Amicus Curiae Institute for Information Law and Policy at 16, Authors Guild, 770 F.
Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 239 (same).
128. In familiar Hohfeldian terms, a future-conduct release is the exercise of a power
to relinquish a right held by the releasor, so that the releasee’s duty becomes a privilege.
See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–33 (1913) (presenting schema for the
consistent use of terminology to describe bilateral legal relationships). In less familiar
Hohfeldian terms, the class action transforms a paucital relationship between class
members (defined by “a unique right residing in a person . . . and availing against a single
person . . . or else . . . one of a few fundamentally similar, yet separate rights, availing . . .
against a few definite persons”) into a multital relationship (defined by “a large class of
fundamentally similar yet separate rights, actual and potential, residing in a single person
. . . but availing respectively against persons constituting a very large and indefinite class of
people”). Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 718 (1916). See generally Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 780–89 (2001)
(reviving and extending Hohfeld’s paucital/multital distinction). The point of the
distinction, for Hohfeld and for Merrill and Smith, is that it marks the boundary between
contract/in personam rights and property/in rem rights. Thus, another way of
understanding the effect of class-wide future-conduct releases is that they put property
rights in play, not just individual obligations. Cf. James Grimmelmann, The Amended
Google Books Settlement Is Still Exclusive, CPI ANTITRUST J. passim (Jan. 26, 2010),
available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-amended-google-bookssettlement-is-still-exclusive (expressing concern that settlement would give Google de
facto exclusive control over orphan works).
129. Cf. Picker, supra note 67, at 406–07 (expressing concern that the settlement
process would be used to claim immunity from future antitrust scrutiny under the NoerrPennington doctrine). The amended settlement specifically responded to Picker’s concern
by adding what Picker called a “no Noerr” clause. See Authors Guild Settlement, supra
note 2, Attachment L, ¶ 17 (“This Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal is not intended
to and does not provide any antitrust immunities to any Persons or parties.”).
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precisely the opposite of what the original class action was supposed
to accomplish.
The key here is that more is different. The settlement can bestow
collective advantages on the defendant that go beyond the sum of the
individual releases it obtains. Centralizing all of these rights in one
party gives it concentrated power. Sometimes, centralization can be a
good thing, particularly in overcoming anticommons problems. 130
This, for example, might make the hypothetical skyscraper settlement
attractive in avoiding hold-up by holdouts. 131
Some anticommons, however, are good things. As the skyscraper
hypothetical also illustrates, there are countervailing reasons why we
ordinarily want to make involuntary land assembly hard,
notwithstanding the risk of foregoing a parcel’s highest and best use.
Widely dispersed property rights protect individual autonomy,
diverse values, and healthy communities. 132 Dispersed ownership can
also serve social goals by making it hard to engage in undesirable
uses, like the overdevelopment of greenfield land. 133 Widely dispersed
power makes markets work; they break down when a monopolist
holds too much power in a market. And dispersed power is central to
democracy; if a small elite holds all the cards, self-governance breaks
down. 134
It gets worse. We ordinarily think of class-action lawsuits as
implicating only the rights of class members and defendants. 135 When
130. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 182–85 (2008)
(discussing anticommons problems); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 667–73 (1998)
(introducing anticommons theory).
131. Cf. D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation 5, 48–
66 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No.
12–42, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2122877
(arguing for class-action and non-class-aggregation procedures designed to allow class
members to “bundle claims and thus capture the surplus that would otherwise go
unrealized” by avoiding holdout problems).
132. See generally Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 917, 927–32 (2010) (synthesizing scholarship on use of property law to
promote human flourishing, virtue, freedom, and democracy).
133. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32–37 (2003).
134. See Grimmelmann, The Elephantine Google Books Settlement, supra note 67, at
517–19 (discussing linked concentration-of-power concerns in the Google Books
settlement).
135. Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphatically insisted that non-parties to a suit are
not generally bound by a judgment. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008)
(rejecting theory of virtual representation); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate
Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 198–203 (2009) (discussing Taylor). Even in a class action,
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a class-action settlement grants rights to the defendant that involve its
future conduct, however, the settlement may practically determine
the rights and interests of third parties—even though they are not
formally bound to its terms. Consider again the healthcare insurance
settlement hypothetical. Doctors were not defendants or members of
the class. But if the settlement excluded all reimbursement for cardiac
stents and required approval of two referring physicians before
paying for visits to dermatologists, then cardiologists and
dermatologists could reasonably object that the settlement would
effectively preclude their rights.
The antitrust objections to the Google Books settlement reflect
these concerns. The accumulation of pricing power in Google and the
Registry would have created a market-dominant player at the stroke
of a pen. 136 Google’s competitors feared that it would leapfrog to a
position of unfair advantage; 137 libraries and academics feared that
parties are not generally bound unless they are actually made members of the class. See
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989). The specific result in Martin was reversed by
statute, see Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(n) (2006)), but the general principle remains.
136. In addition to the fact that the settlement itself was being used as a coordinated
license grant by competitors in the book market, Google would have had de facto
exclusivity as to orphan works, and the institutional subscription would have been a
product with no close substitutes.
137. The Authors Guild opinion discusses antitrust issues, but only briefly. See Authors
Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 682–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). More extensive
discussion can be found in the filings. See Objection of Amazon.com, Inc., to Proposed
Amended Settlement at 10–21, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136),
ECF No. 823; Objection of Amazon.com, Inc., to Proposed Settlement at 15–31, Authors
Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 206; Objection to Class Action
Settlement and Notice of Intent to Appear on Behalf of Class Members AT&T Corp. and
Affiliates at 12–21, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 863;
Objections of Microsoft Corp. to Proposed Amended Settlement and Certification of
Proposed Settlement Class and Sub-Classes at 15–25, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666
(No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 874; Statement of Interest II, supra note 11, at 16–23;
Statement of Interest I, supra note 54, at 16–26; Objection of Yahoo! Inc. to Final
Approval of the Proposed Class Action Settlement at 21–26, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp.
2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 288; Brief Amicus Curiae of Consumer Watchdog in
Opposition to the Proposed Settlement Agreement at 18–22, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp.
2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 263; Supplemental Memorandum of Amicus Curiae
Open Book Alliance in Opposition to the Proposed Settlement Between the Authors
Guild, Inc., Association of American Publishers, Inc., et al., and Google Inc. passim,
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 840; Memorandum of
Amicus Curiae Open Book Alliance in Opposition to the Proposed Settlement Between
the Authors Guild, Inc., Association of American Publishers, Inc., et al., and Google Inc.
passim, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No 282. But see
Elhauge, supra note 67, passim (offering spirited and detailed antitrust defense of the
settlement); Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum Responding to Specific Objections at
138–54, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 955; Brief of
Google, Inc. in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement
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Google would use its judicially granted exclusivity to price the musthave subscription service extortionately. 138 The fear of concentrated
power is also clearly at work in objections that the Google Books
settlement would have led to the loss of reader privacy. 139 Google’s
privacy policies are one thing if it is one bookseller among many in a
crowded market, but quite another if Google is the only source for
millions of orphan books.
E.

Separation of Powers

Future-conduct settlements can make prospective changes
affecting large numbers of people in complex ways. This is the
province of legislation and rulemaking. 140 For reasons of technical
competence and democratic accountability, decisions of this sort are
committed to the political branches. 141 Judges are limited in the
at 28–51, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 941; Amicus
Brief of Antitrust Law and Economics Professors in Support of the Settlement passim,
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 275 (same as Elhauge,
supra, in brief format); Randal C. Picker, Assessing Competition Issues in the Amended
Google Book Search Settlement 3–5 (Univ. of Chi. Inst. for Law & Econ. Olin Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 499, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507172
(giving reasons to believe that antitrust scrutiny could be deferred until after
implementation of settlement). The arguments given by the settlement’s antitrust
defenders were notably more detailed than those given by most of the objectors.
138. See Library Ass’n Comments on the Proposed Settlement at 19–21, Authors
Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 387 (expressing concern but
recommending continued oversight rather than rejection of the settlement); Pamela
Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94 MINN L. REV.
1308, 1333–44 (2010) (describing “[l]ibrary and [a]cademic [r]esearcher [n]ightmares”
including price-gouging and exacerbated inequality among institutions).
139. See Privacy Authors and Publishers’ Objection to Proposed Settlement at 8,
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), ECF No. 325; Brief Amicus Curiae
of the Center for Democracy & Technology in Support of Approval of the Settlement and
Protection of Reader Privacy at 7–11, Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ.
8136), ECF No. 314; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of EPIC’s
[Electronic Privacy Information Center] Motion to Intervene at 14–15, Authors Guild, 770
F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 05 Civ. 8136), available at http://thepublicindex.org
/docs/letters/epic.pdf.
140. See NAGAREDA, supra note 116, at 61 (“Adjudication characteristically deals with
the legal consequences of past conduct for particular purposes. . . . Rulemaking, by
contrast, characteristically involves the setting of legal standards for the future that bind
the public at large.”).
141. See, e.g., MARTIN REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009) (arguing that
broad swaths of class-action law are democratically illegitimate because they cause courts
to reach beyond the judicial function); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of
Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 1531, 1534 (1973) [hereinafter Henderson, Judicial Review] (“But courts are not
suited to the task of establishing specific product safety standards . . . .”); James A.
Henderson, Jr., Comment: Settlement Class Actions and the Limits of Adjudication, 80
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sources of information they can draw on; they are ill-suited to balance
conflicting normative claims in an open-textured way; they are not
directly accountable to the people whose lives they will reshape. For
all of these reasons, the judicial branch is normally considered an
inferior place to resolve polycentric problems. 142 In Richard
Nagareda’s words, “[T]he basis for the implied delegation of
bargaining power to class counsel must arise from matters that
preexist the class action itself and, accordingly, . . . a class
settlement—unlike public legislation—enjoys no general mandate to
alter unilaterally the rights of class members.” 143
By having a single group draft a settlement, the class-action
process tends toward central planning. By submitting that settlement
to a judge for approval, it channels everything through the actor least
competent to make the intricate technical decisions and contestable
value tradeoffs required. 144 Because the judge is not permitted to
modify the settlement but must give an up-or-down ruling on it, 145 the
class-action settlement process delegates tremendous agenda-setting
power to the attorneys. 146 We should not expect the resulting
arrangements to reflect anything like majoritarian preferences. They
are not “appropriate for judicial, as opposed to legislative,
resolution.” 147
The healthcare reform hypothetical is a good illustration of these
dangers. Congress spent months of intense debate and horse-trading
on the Affordable Care Act; the near-complete attention of the

CORNELL L. REV. 1014 passim (1995) [hereinafter Henderson, Settlement Class Actions]
(extending argument to mass tort class actions).
142. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Form and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 394–404 (1978) (developing idea that a “situation of interacting points of influence” is
“beyond the proper limits of adjudication”).
143. Nagareda, supra note 96, at 156–57.
144. See Fuller, supra note 142, at 394–404 (arguing that “polycentric” tasks—in which
each decision has complex repercussions—are “inherently unsuited to adjudication”);
Henderson, Judicial Review, supra note 141, at 1534 (arguing that “[c]ourts are inherently
unsuited” to such “polycentric” tasks as establishing product safety standards for
manufacturers).
145. See, e.g., Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1160 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Courts
are not permitted to modify settlement terms or in any manner to rewrite the agreement
reached by the parties.”).
146. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183,
1236 (1982).
147. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 894 (2012) (citing Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.,
770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
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nation’s political institutions was focused on the issue. 148 What
emerged was a complex compromise, one that achieved majority
support in Congress only through extensive modification to meet the
demands of numerous constituencies. 149 As printed in the Statutes at
Large, it takes up 906 pages. 150 If all of this could have been done
instead by a court, why even have a Congress? 151 The point is even
starker with the skyscraper settlement. Eminent domain is supposed
to be an inherently public process for which the political branches can
be held accountable: the Public Use Clause prohibits privatizing the
process. 152 A class-action settlement, however, is drafted by a private
party and overseen only by the judicial branch: precisely the opposite
of the way the system is supposed to work. 153
Sometimes, judges cannot avoid being caught up in these
“legislative” functions. The rise of structural reform litigation—
lawsuits challenging school segregation, prison overcrowding, police
brutality, and other systemic governmental abuses—required judges
to engage deeply with the creation and governance of institutions,
and to make prospective decisions about how they would be run in
ways that would affect large populations. 154 In all of these cases,
148. See generally LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE
REFORM AND AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW (2010)
(describing history of PPACA).
149. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675 (2012) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
150. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119, 119–124 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
151. Cf. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“[T]he establishment of a mechanism for exploiting unclaimed books is a matter more
suited for Congress than this Court. . . . The questions of who should be entrusted with
guardianship over orphan books, under what terms, and with what safeguards are matters
more appropriately decided by Congress than through an agreement among private, selfinterested parties.”); id. at 680 (deferring to Congress in setting copyright policy in
response to technological change); id. at 685–86 (deferring to Congress given the
international ramifications of the settlement); Samuelson, supra note 13, at 482 (“An
intriguing way to view the GBS settlement is as a mechanism through which to achieve
copyright reform that Congress has not yet been and may never be willing to do.”).
152. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782–83 (1995) (arguing that
courts’ role in enforcing the Public Use clause should focus on failures of the political
process).
153. Cf. Rubenstein, supra note 81, at 432 (“[D]ealmaking appears to contradict a
fundamental premise of adjudication—namely, that the substantive outcomes of cases
should depend upon the application of pre-existing legal norms.”).
154. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (describing new “public law litigation” model that departs from
traditional party-centric adversarial model and requires “complex forms of ongoing relief”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword, The Forms of Justice, 93
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however, the problem comes at the remedial stage. 155 If a prison
system is overcrowded to a degree that violates the Constitution, then
the judge hearing a class-action lawsuit by the inmates must do
something about it, or the constitutional violation will continue. 156 If a
school system is unlawfully segregated and refuses to change its
practices, then the political branches have shirked their responsibility
to an extent that itself violates the law. 157 There is no alternative to
judicial involvement; there is no road around the swamp. 158
In contrast, a future-conduct settlement is never necessary in this
sense. 159 Litigation is always an option. The resulting judgment will
define the defendant’s rights and duties vis-à-vis the class, and it will
therefore provide a roadmap for their future dealings. 160 The
outcomes available in litigation may not be socially optimal, but if
they are not, it is the legislature’s responsibility to fix the problem,
not the courts’. 161 The purpose of class certification is “to generate
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1979); Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of
Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 125 (1982) [hereinafter Fiss, The Social and
Political Foundations of Adjudication].
155. The signal remedial innovation of public-law litigation was its development of
novel injunctions on the defendant institutions. See generally OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978) (describing increased use of structural injunctions in civil
rights litigation and providing jurisprudential justification of the practice). This
immediately distinguishes it from the imposition of future-conduct releases on class
members. For a discussion of the historical link between reform litigation and modern
class action procedure, see generally David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation
Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011).
156. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 467 (1980) (arguing that
structural reform cases are driven by recognition of new constitutional rights).
157. See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 692 (1982).
158. Indeed, in these situations, settlements risk becoming ways to avoid enforcing the
law. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing that
the judicial role is “to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative
texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality
into accord with them”).
159. Cf. Henderson, Settlement Class Actions, supra note 141, at 1021 (contrasting
public-law litigation with settlements that “delegate[] power to the powerful”).
160. Indeed, this is a strong argument against future-conduct settlements. They deprive
others on the plaintiff side the benefit of an actual ruling on the issue in question while
giving the defendant benefits denied to others in its position. Cf. Fiss, The Social and
Political Foundations of Adjudication, supra note 154, at 121. (arguing for public value of
open litigation); infra Part III.B.4 (discussing danger of a settlement good for one
defendant only).
161. This point depends on a normative belief about the proper roles of courts and
legislatures in a democratic system. Compare Chayes, supra note 154, at 1297−98
(defending expansive judicial role), and Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of
Adjudication, supra note 154, at 126−27 (same), with DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE
COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 22−23 (1977) (arguing against expansive judicial role), and
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common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation,” not
social reform. 162
III. A STANDARD: HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
Future-conduct releases are unusually dangerous to class
members, and sometimes even to society. Courts can and should
respond to these dangers by scrutinizing settlements containing
future-conduct releases more closely, and in some cases prohibiting
them entirely. The former is a standard; the latter is a rule. Start with
the standard.
A. Doctrinal Justification
The presence of a future-conduct release is, at the very least, a
major warning sign that this is not a run-of-the-mill settlement. 163
Courts should, nay must, look on future-conduct settlements with
more than their usual skepticism. 164 They are required to do so by the
ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 197 (2004) (same). The same decisions must also be
made in debates about the judicial role in supervising class actions. Compare Jack B.
Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 559 (1994)
(arguing for active judicial role), with PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL:
MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 258−59 (1988) (expressing skepticism about
Judge Weinstein’s close involvement in brokering the Agent Orange settlement); see also
REDISH, supra note 141, at 27 (arguing that democratic principles require more stringent
limits on class actions). As a matter of doctrine, the decision has already been made in
favor of a limited judicial role. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999)
(“[W]e are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it upon its adoption, and . . . we are
not free to alter it except through the process prescribed by Congress in the Rules
Enabling Act.”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628−29 (1997) (“The
argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime
would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of
asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution.”).
162. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (emphasis omitted
and added) (quoting Richard Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 974, 131–32 (2009)).
163. Cf. Issacharoff, supra note 117, at 833 (“Any class seeking to bind future claimants
or foreclose future harms should also be suspect—particularly if these future claims do not
create an active case or controversy under applicable substantive law.”).
164. There is precedent for this approach. Courts have learned to identify indicia of
potential unfairness and to apply heightened scrutiny to settlements when those indicia are
present. For example, compensation to class members in the form of coupons rather than
cash is “enough to raise suspicions.” In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743, 748
(7th Cir. 2001). Congress has effectively codified this judicial suspicion of coupon
settlements. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, § 3(a), 119 Stat. 4, 6 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1712(e) (2006)) (requiring “[j]udicial [s]crutiny of [c]oupon [s]ettlements”). See
generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action
Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANAL. 167 (2009) (discussing “facial issues” justifying more than
usual scrutiny of settlements).
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text of Rule 23, and by the Due Process Clause—and perhaps even by
constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction.
1. Rule 23
Rule 23(a)(4)’s guarantee of adequate representation requires
courts to ensure that class counsel’s advocacy reaches a basic
threshold of zealousness. 165 But the bargaining around a futureconduct release is so open-ended that there is no meaningful
procedural standard by which a court can evaluate whether class
counsel have been sufficiently vigorous in the negotiations.
Substantive “hard-look” review of the resulting settlement is the only
viable alternative.
That review comes from Rule 23(e)(2), which provides that a
court may only approve a settlement binding class members on a
finding that it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 166 The courts of
appeals implement this requirement with multi-factor balancing
tests. 167 The courts “have wide discretion in assessing the weight and
applicability of each factor,” 168 so the special risks of future-conduct
releases can easily be folded into these factors. 169
2. Due Process
Heightened scrutiny goes deeper than just Rule 23: it is also
required by the Due Process Clause. In class action cases, Due
Process requires adequate representation “at all times,” 170 which in
turn requires closer oversight from the court in future-conduct cases.
165. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4); see id. 23(g)(4) (requiring that counsel “must fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class”); see also id. 23(g)(1)(B) (stating that the
court “may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the class”).
166. Id. 23(e)(2).
167. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (listing
eight factors to be considered); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir.
1974) (listing nine factors to be considered), abrogated on other grounds, Goldberger v.
Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000).
168. 5 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.164[1] (Jerold S.
Solovy et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012).
169. Further, in damages class actions, “class members’ interests in individually
controlling the prosecution” of the lawsuit and settlement is stronger when the stakes are
higher and the outcome will affect them prospectively. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A). As the
settlement becomes more and more sweeping, the court becomes obliged to consider the
relative “undesirability of concentrating” resolution “of the claims in the particular
forum.” Id. 23(b)(3)(C).
170. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). See generally Linda S.
Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs’ Due Process: Implications for
Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871 (1995) (discussing Shutts).
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The higher stakes for class members in future-conduct settlements
and the greater risks of error go directly to the first two factors in the
Matthews v. Eldridge 171 test: the “private interest” at stake and the
“risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest.” 172 Set against these
concerns, the added value of heightened scrutiny is substantial and
the cost of closer judicial attention well worth bearing.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Supreme Court’s longstanding concern for class members’ Due Process rights in cases
involving potential conflicts between class members. Such conflicts, of
course, go to adequacy of representation; conflicted class
representatives are not constitutionally adequate representatives. 173
Future-conduct cases do not necessarily involve internal conflicts. But
the important word in that sentence is “necessarily.” Future-conduct
settlements can involve particularly insidious conflicts that become
apparent only over time. The defendant may become able to behave
differently toward class members, putting them in different shoes in
ways they cannot predict or protect against.
Indeed, absentees qua absentees may be in a particularly
vulnerable position in a future-conduct settlement. This was one of
the problems with the Google Books settlement. One of the
justifications for the settlement was to make orphan books available
again. But orphan owners, precisely because of their status as orphan
owners, were essentially guaranteed to be absent class members and
could be expected not to be active participants in the settlement’s
administration. 174 The settlement was engineered specifically to take
advantage of their absence, and by using future-conduct releases it
was able to achieve something very close to an exclusive license to
their books, a license good for Google only. Heightened scrutiny is
the very least that absent class members deserve when their
prospective rights are at stake.
3. Personal Jurisdiction
A close reading of the Supreme Court’s leading modern classaction Due Process case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 175 reinforces
171. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
172. Id. at 335.
173. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (“Such a selection of representatives
for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably
the same as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to
absent parties which due process requires.”).
174. See supra notes 48–51, 66 and sources cited therein.
175. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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this conclusion. 176 The case is remembered for its holding that Due
Process—in the form of personal jurisdiction over class members in a
state class action—is satisfied by notice, an opt-out right, and
adequate representation. 177 But the assumptions behind that holding
are crucial. The Court explained at length the distinctions between
class-action plaintiffs and “a defendant in a normal civil suit[.]” 178 A
defendant faces “the full powers of the forum State to render
judgment against it”; 179 class-action plaintiffs are not “haled anywhere
to defend themselves upon pain of a default judgment” 180 and are
“almost never subject to counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability for
fees or costs.” 181
The underlying assumption here is that a plaintiff risks only a
choice in action, whereas a defendant can suffer substantial harms
from an adverse judgment. But that is precisely the contrast drawn
above between a suit for damages and a future-conduct settlement:
the latter can expose class members to unbounded future harms. The
availability of future-conduct releases in class-action settlements
therefore depends on the provision of sufficient procedural
protections for class members: again, heightened Rule 23(e)(2)
scrutiny is the very least they have a right to expect. 182 Courts that do
not provide it may not even have personal jurisdiction over absent
class members who give future-conduct releases. 183
B.

Applying Heightened Scrutiny

To put heightened scrutiny into practice, courts examining
future-conduct releases should direct their attention to the ways those
releases can go wrong. Thus, the concerns described above in Part II
are a kind of inspection checklist. They are not factors to be balanced:
an extreme risk of moral hazard cannot be outweighed by a
176. Id. at 810.
177. Id. at 812–13.
178. Id. at 810.
179. Id. at 808 (emphasis omitted).
180. Id. at 809.
181. Id. at 810.
182. Cf. id. at 810 n.2 (reserving judgment over cases in which class members are
potentially out of pocket for counterclaims or fees).
183. The argument from personal jurisdiction does not directly apply to cases in federal
court applying federal law. See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1068.1 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing
personal jurisdiction in federal-question cases). But even there, Shutts still provides
instructive guidance about the expected burdens and dangers to a party of being a class
member in a distant forum. The question of the precise interaction of Rule 4, Rule 23, and
the Fifth Amendment is best deferred to another time.
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correspondingly low risk of concentrated power. Instead, they give
courts a way to think through the likely consequences of approving a
settlement. Thus, this section groups its recommendations in terms of
those concerns, and offers specific suggestions for ways courts can
address some of the different kinds of future-conduct risks when they
are present in a settlement. 184
1. High Stakes
Because class members give up more in a settlement containing
both past- and future-conduct releases than they do in a settlement
containing only past-conduct releases, 185 the court should expect that
they will be given more in return. The court should make a searching
effort to identify just what rights the class will be giving up going
forward, to put a value on those rights, and to ask whether the
settlement appropriately compensates them. At the very least, there
should be some additional compensation for these releases over and
above what a past-conduct release alone would have warranted. 186
Whenever feasible, class members should be given the choice of
whether to accept the future-conduct portion of the settlement, or just
the past-conduct portion. 187

184. These recommendations for heightened scrutiny are not meant to create a hardand-fast line against future-conduct releases. For one thing, as explained infra Part IV.A,
some settlements involving future-conduct releases are legitimate and can be fair to class
members. For another, this Article already proposes a hard-and-fast line against some
future-conduct releases: those that fail the parity-of-preclusion test. Instead, heightened
scrutiny is an across-the-board standard intended to direct judicial attention to those
aspects of future-conduct releases that are likely to be the most dangerous.
185. See supra Part II.A.
186. For example, the settlement in In re Literary Works in Electric Databases
Copyright Litigation provided for 100% of scheduled payments to class members who
gave a future-conduct release, and 65% of the scheduled payments for those class
members who gave only past conduct releases. Settlement Agreement § 5.a., In re Literary
Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d and
remanded in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010) (Nos. 05−5943 &
06−0223) (reducing payments by thirty five percent for those authors who opt out of
allowing future uses). The Authors Guild settlement also displayed this feature. Compare
Authors Guild Settlement, supra note 2, § 5.1 (one-time payment for past digitization),
with id. art IV (ongoing payments for future uses).
187. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 23, § 5.1(a) (allowing class members to opt
out of future uses without opting out of the settlement entirely); Authors Guild Amended
Settlement, supra note 2, § 3.5(b) (allowing class members to opt out of certain future uses
without opting out of the settlement entirely). The presence of such an option helps the
court in assessing whether the settlement provides sufficient incremental compensation for
future-conduct releases, because it requires them to be explicitly valued.
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2. Uncertainty
Because future-conduct releases are harder to design, 188 the court
must be more skeptical of their terms. Because class members will
have less ability to predict the consequences of such releases, the
court should require more rigorous notice. 189 Because the court itself
will have a hard time evaluating the consequences, it should consider
appointing a special master or an independent class representative to
serve as a devil’s advocate in exploring the possible negative
consequences. 190 Because class counsel have weak incentives to get
the design right in the long run if their compensation is payable
immediately, the court should consider insisting that any awards of
attorneys’ fees be subject to a deferred compensation scheme that
links class counsel’s fees to the class’s fate going forward. 191
3. Moral Hazard
Terms that could create perverse incentives on the defendant’s
part require especially close attention. 192 The court should be careful
188. See supra Part II.B.
189. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (questioning
“whether class action notice sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever be
given to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous” as those in an asbestos future-claims
case); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811−12 (1985) (discussing notice
requirement in class actions).
190. Variants of this idea have been regularly mooted. See, e.g., Alon Klement, Who
Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21
REV. LITIG. 25, 28 (2002); Lahav, supra note 107, at 128−30; Rubenstein, supra note 107,
at 1453–56; Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 461, 529 (2000).
This proposal differs in that it focuses on a particular kind of settlement feature that poses
special concerns. Still, it may suffer from some of the same concerns identified by other
scholars, such as a reluctance by court-appointed guardians to guard. See Koniak &
Cohen, supra note 79, at 1110–11. One analogy could be the “future claims representative”
in asbestos bankruptcy cases, who is charged with “protecting the rights of persons that
might subsequently assert demands of such kind,” i.e., future asbestos tort claims. 11
U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (2006). The record there, however, is not entirely encouraging.
See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 833,
876–89 (2005) (discussing conflicts of interest of futures representatives); Mark D. Plevin
et al., The Future Claims Representative in Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies, 62 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 271, 271−72 (2006) (describing capture of future claims
representatives by debtors and current claimants); NAGAREDA, supra note 116, at 174−82
(discussing possibilities for reform).
191. Cf. Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1086–98 (2002)
(proposing that class counsel in coupon settlements be paid in coupons); Yair Listokin &
Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L.
REV. 1435, 1441 (2004) (building on earlier proposals by Mark Roe and Thomas Smith to
link compensation of future claims representative and compensation to future claimants in
§ 524(g) proceedings).
192. See supra Part II.C.
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to detail what the worst-case scenarios for class members are, and to
make sure that the settlement has internal safeguards against those
scenarios. Because some problems will present themselves only over
time, the court should retain jurisdiction so that class members can
request modification of the settlement if it later appears that the
settlement is going off course. 193 It should also consider requiring that
class members have the ability to opt out of the forward-looking
provisions of the settlement in the future, once they can see what
those provisions actually entail. 194
4. Concentrated Power
Because future-conduct releases can give the defendant
concentrated power, 195 the court should ask whether the settlement
would have such an effect. The question is whether the releases
collectively give the defendant a freedom of action that is
qualitatively different from what it would obtain if it had an
individual release from a single class member. This concern will be
most prominent if the lawsuit has a commercial character (such that it
presents antitrust risks) or if it involves class members’ speech
interests (such that it presents risks to democratic values). The court
should not limit its inquiry to class members’ interests; third parties

193. See Arata v. Nu Skin Int’l, Inc., 96 F.3d 1265, 1268–69 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that a court approving a class-action settlement has the discretion to decide whether to
retain jurisdiction). This is precisely what courts in future-claims cases have done. The
court that approved the fen-phen settlement “hereby retains continuing and exclusive
jurisdiction over this action and each of the Parties . . . to administer, supervise, interpret
and enforce the Settlement.” Pretrial Order No. 1415 ¶ 11, In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 99-20593, 2010 WL 1270348 (E.D. Pa. 2010); see also Nationwide Class Action
Settlement Agreement with American Home Products Corp. § VIII.B.1, In re Diet Drugs
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2010 WL 1270348 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (providing that the
court “will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all provisions of this Agreement,
including the creation and operation of the Settlement Trust”). The settlement has since
been amended ten times. See Tenth Amendment to the Nationwide Class Action
Settlement Agreement with American Home Products Corp., In re Diet Drugs Prods.
Liab. Litig. (No. 99-20593), 2010 WL 1270348 (E.D. Pa. 2010); see also Wasserman, supra
note 63, at 458 (recommending retained jurisdiction).
194. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing back-end opt-out rights). If a
future-conduct settlement does not provide for back-end opt-out rights, later courts should
be prepared to create them by holding that absent class members were not adequately
represented in the initial “litigation.” See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, Just Go Away:
Representation, Due Process, and Preclusion in Class Actions, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1079,
1126 (2009) (suggesting “the use of an opt-in procedure for unnamed class members as a
prerequisite to applying the preclusion doctrines”).
195. See supra Part II.D.
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can also be affected. 196 In an appropriate case, the court may need to
appoint a special master to help identify third parties whose
legitimate interests are likely to be prejudiced. 197
5. Separation of Powers
Because future-conduct releases require the court to take on a
legislative role, 198 it should exercise great caution. Where the subject
of the lawsuit is governed by a statute or by public-policy values
expressed by the legislature, the court should require that the
settlement be consistent with them. 199 If the legislature has not
spoken, the court should require that it be able to: the settlement
must not lock in an arrangement that is not subject to legislative
override if the court has erred. 200 If representatives of the political
branches file objections or appear at the fairness hearing, the court
should give their views due deference. 201 The court should be
196. See In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan & Irap Litig., 957 F.2d 1020, 1026
(2d Cir. 1992) (“Where the rights of third parties are affected [by a class action
settlement], however, their interests too must be considered.”). To be clear, I am not
suggesting that a future-conduct settlement requires this kind of scrutiny because it could
foreclose the rights of third parties by binding them to its terms. That would be obviously
problematic, and inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. See Douglas Laycock,
Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U.
CHI. LEGAL. F. 103, 103−04 (1987) (arguing that a consent decree between two parties that
transfers the potential rights of a third party requires consent by the third party); supra
note 173 and accompanying text.
197. Cf. supra note 188–90 and accompanying text (discussing appointment of
representative for class members with claims based on future conduct). This problem may
sometimes be easier. The representative may need only to identify the appropriate third
parties so that they can be given appropriate notice, after which they may be able to
appear on their own behalf. Where these third parties are sufficiently interested in the
settlement to have standing—which in concentrated-power cases they frequently will—
courts should be liberal in allowing them to intervene for the limited purpose of filing
objections, so that they can both be heard and preserve their right to appeal if the
settlement is approved. Compare Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002) (allowing
unnamed class members to appeal from order approving settlement without formal
intervention), with Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (preventing nonparties who
have not intervened from appealing order approving settlement).
198. See supra Part II.E.
199. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677, 680, 685–86 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (considering copyright policy); see also Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004)
(holding that a consent decree “must further the objectives of the law upon which the
complaint was based”).
200. The skyscraper settlement, for example, is effectively irreversible once
construction starts. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER 218 (1974)
(describing judges and elected officials as “hogtied by the physical beginning of a
project”).
201. Their views are not entitled to special deference on what the substantive law is;
that is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department.” Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Instead, they are entitled to deference in their
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concerned if it appears that the settlement will create political or
diplomatic trouble for the political branches in their relationships
with other jurisdictions. 202 The more far-reaching the settlement, the
more reluctant the court should be to act at all.
IV. A RULE: PARITY OF PRECLUSION
The heightened-scrutiny standard applies to all settlements
containing future-conduct releases. In a narrower class of cases, it
should be supplemented with a bright-line rule that bars such releases
entirely. A recurring theme in the normative case against futureconduct releases is that they sever the connection between a
settlement and the underlying lawsuit it “settles.” 203 If so, then a
natural response is to insist on a tighter connection between the two.
Since releases are the principal source of danger to class members, it
is there that the connection must be reestablished. This is the parityof-preclusion principle: a class-action settlement should be able to
release a future-conduct claim if and only if the claim could have been
lost in litigation.
The intuitive case for parity is simple. We have already chosen
where to draw the outer boundary around permissible class actions:
those choices should also be reflected in the boundaries around
permissible class-action settlements. If we trust class counsel enough
with a claim to risk it in litigation, we should trust them also to settle
that claim. If we do not trust them to gamble with a claim in litigation,
we should not let them sell it, either. The job of class representatives
is to “litigate the claims presented or settle the claims presented.” 204
explanations of the political considerations underlying future lawmaking. In the Google
Books case, for example, the Register of Copyrights testified to Congress that the
settlement could “inappropriately interfere with the on-going efforts of Congress to enact
orphan works legislation in a manner that takes into account the concerns of all
stakeholders” and subject the United States to “diplomatic stress.” Competition and
Commerce in Digital Books: Hearing on the Proposed Google Book Settlement Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 68 (2009) (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights).
202. The governments of France and Germany filed amicus briefs objecting to the
Google Books settlement, and the German government sent the head of the Division of
Copyright and Publishing Law at the Federal Ministry of Justice to speak at the fairness
hearing. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Settlement Proposal on Behalf of
the French Republic, Authors Guild v. Google, No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2009);
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Amended Settlement Agreement on Behalf of
the Federal Republic of Germany, Authors Guild v. Google, No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 2010); Transcript of Fairness Hearing, supra note 87, at 69–74.
203. See supra Part II.
204. Transcript of Fairness Hearing, supra note 87, at 119 (statement of William
Cavanaugh).
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One might ask whether we should ever allow future-conduct
releases by a class. The answer is yes: sometimes we should, because
we effectively allow them as a result of litigation. Imagine a simple
class action for nuisance against a polluting factory by a few hundred
nearby landowners. 205 It is entirely plausible that the landowners will
be awarded permanent damages but no injunction. 206 That result is
functionally identical to a settlement that includes future-conduct
releases in exchange for cash compensation. 207 It would be bizarre to
argue that parties should be prohibited from settling on terms that the
court itself might quite reasonably have ordered. 208 True, the court
will need to make sure the compensation is sufficient, and that the
releases are appropriately limited so as not to create a perverse
incentive for the defendant to intensify its activities—but it would
have had to do that anyway as part of its judgment order. 209 If the
landowners can give a release only for the factory’s past conduct, then
the case cannot practically be settled. Whatever the parties agree to
will be effective only up through the day the settlement takes effect;
after that, the landowners will have a fresh cause of action for the
factory’s future pollution. The only stable settlement would be a
complete capitulation by the factory, one in which it agrees to shut
down. By contrast, if the landowners can give a future-conduct
release, then the range of possible settlements reflects the full range
of plausible outcomes in litigation.
This example illustrates three things. First, the legal system
sometimes already allows plaintiffs to put future-conduct claims in
205. E.g., Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 406 (6th Cir. 2008).
206. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (granting
permanent damages in lieu of injunction).
207. This is just a rephrasing of the distinction between property rules and liability
rules. Both the permanent damages in lieu of injunction and the settlement for a futureconduct release amount to the transfer of the relevant entitlement to the defendant at an
“objectively determined value.” Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1092 (1972).
208. See, e.g., In re: Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 535 (3d Cir. 2004)
(“[T]here is an overriding public interest in settling class action litigation, and it should
therefore be encouraged.”); Bonnette v. Long Island Coll. Hosp., 819 N.E.2d 206, 209
(2004) (describing the State’s “strong policy promoting settlement”). But see Fiss, supra
note 158, at 1085–87 (arguing that settlement erodes public-law values served by
adjudication).
209. Again, this point simply reflects the property-rule/liability-rule distinction. The
court awarding liability-rule protection must both define the entitlement and put a value
on it, and those tasks are necessary both in settlement and in an ordinary judgment. See
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 207, at 1092 (“[L]iability rules involve an additional
stage of state intervention . . . .”).
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play. Second, for reasons of judicial economy, the system already
prefers to resolve those claims together with the rest of the dispute. 210
And third, the policies promoting settlement counsel in favor of
letting parties do by settlement what the court could have imposed on
them. Taken together, these points establish the principle: since some
class actions really do test the legality of a defendant’s future conduct,
settlements of those class actions can do so, too. 211
This Part will flesh out this account of parity of preclusion. Part
IV.A will explain what it means to say that a claim “could have been
lost in litigation,” giving that phrase a precise meaning in terms of
preclusion doctrine. Part IV.B will analyze the courts’ closest
approximation to parity of preclusion: the identical factual predicate
doctrine. Part IV.C will defend parity on doctrinal grounds. Part IV.D
will answer doctrinal objections. Finally, Part IV.E will defend parity
on normative grounds.
A. Claims that Can and Cannot Be Precluded
To understand how far the parity-of-preclusion principle reaches,
it is necessary to be precise about when one could “lose a claim in
litigation.” And that, in turn, requires us to be precise about the body
of law that deals with losing claims in litigation: preclusion doctrine. 212
Imagine a plaintiff class that sues a defendant and loses. What is
the largest possible set of claims that could be precluded against class
members as a result? For the sake of the hypothetical, we can assume
that the class will bring the broadest possible suit. Because the federal
Rules permit plaintiffs to join all of their claims against the defendant
in one action, 213 a single class action can litigate every claim arising
out of the defendant’s conduct that is susceptible to class treatment. 214
210. This point recalls the maxim that equity will take jurisdiction to avoid a
multiplicity of suits.
211. This is most apparent for mandatory class actions by necessity under Rule
23(b)(1)(A), when individual lawsuits would risk “incompatible standards of conduct” for
the defendant. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). The entire point of such a class action is to
decide the legality of the defendant’s future conduct all at once. Unless some futureconduct releases are available, such class actions can never be settled. The same goes for
injunctive-relief class actions under Rule 23(b)(2). “[F]inal injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole” only when
there is some future conduct to which that relief could apply. Id. 23(b)(2).
212. See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005) (discussing application of preclusion doctrines to class
members).
213. FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a).
214. See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 881 (1984) (finding
no preclusive effect on individual claims of discrimination from a judgment in a class
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Ripeness, however, will limit the suit to claims arising out of the
defendant’s past conduct. 215 Pleading doctrines prevent the
complaint—and hence the lawsuit—from going beyond what the
defendant has actually done. 216 Nor can the class go further by
seeking a declaratory judgment or a preventative injunction.
Although they deal with the defendant’s threatened future conduct,
that conduct must genuinely be threatened on the basis of the
defendant’s actual past conduct. 217
Claim preclusion will bar all of the claims litigated to a “valid and
final” judgment. 218 Again for the sake of the hypothetical we can
assume that all of the claims asserted in the complaint are fully
action alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1980) (denying claim-preclusive effect when the plaintiff “was
unable to rely on a certain theory of the case . . . because of the limitations on the subject
matter jurisdiction of the courts”); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 863–64
(1999) (“[T]he settlement’s fairness under Rule 23(e) does not dispense with the
requirements of Rules 23(a) and (b).”); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620
(1997) (“[Provisions of Rule 23] designed to protect absentees . . . demand undiluted, even
heightened, attention in the settlement context.”).
215. This line between past and future is no more uncertain than the one courts already
must draw between present and future claims. See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra
note 9, at 1625 (discussing line between present and future claims).
216. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (stating that an attorney submitting a pleading
certifies that its “factual contentions have evidentiary support”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard.
A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the
Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous
parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(holding that a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter” that its “ ‘claim to relief
. . . is plausible on its face’ ” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007))).
217. On declaratory judgments, see 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006) (restricting a federal
court’s ability to award declaratory relief to “a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 216, 239–40 (1937) (“The
Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to ‘cases of actual controversy,’
manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision and is operative only in respect to
controversies which are such in the constitutional sense.”). On preventative injunctions,
see Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (holding that plaintiff lacked Article III
standing to seek an injunction against police use of chokeholds, since there was no “real
and immediate threat” that he would be choked in the future). While Lyons has been
criticized by commentators who regret that it makes some unlawful governmental
practices effectively unchallengeable, see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Of Justiciability,
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1984), future-conduct releases show that broad justiciability standards are a
two-edged sword. While broad justiciability might allow for the vindication of individual
rights in cases like Lyons, broad justiciability could be used to eliminate individual rights
entirely in future-conduct settlements.
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17, 19 (1980); see also Parklane
Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) (comparing and explaining the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel).
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litigated. Since the class can only plead ripe claims, claim preclusion
can only bar ripe claims—i.e., those arising out of the defendant’s past
conduct. 219
Issue preclusion, however, can effectively extinguish some
future-conduct claims. The basic rule of issue preclusion is that
parties to a lawsuit may not relitigate any issues decided against them
that were “essential” to the judgment. 220 Only past-conduct claims
and the issues they present can be litigated—but where a futureconduct claim depends on an issue actually litigated, issue preclusion
can apply to it. Thus, issue preclusion can bar those future-conduct
claims that share an essential issue with a past-conduct claim that the
class could have brought.
The implications for parity of preclusion are straightforward.
Any past-conduct claim can be barred by claim preclusion, and hence
can be settled. Any future-conduct claim that depends on an issue
essential to a past-conduct claim can be barred by issue preclusion,
and hence can also be settled. Neither form of preclusion could apply
to future-conduct claims that are materially different from any pastconduct claims the class can bring—call them “novel” future-conduct
claims—and hence these claims cannot be settled. Ripeness draws the
line between “past” and “future” conduct; pleading doctrines enforce
that line by preventing the parties from presenting fictional issues.
The effect is to require a close connection between the past conduct
challenged in the lawsuit and the future conduct permitted by the
settlement: generally only a materially identical continuation of the
defendant’s past conduct will satisfy parity of preclusion.
A court applying this test must exercise care in two respects. The
first is that a complaint submitted by class counsel seeking settlement
cannot always be taken at face value. The reviewing court must be
willing to look beyond the complaint at least to the extent required by
Ashcroft v. Iqbal 221 and Rule 11. The plaintiffs in the pollution suit
would not, for example, have been allowed to submit a complaint
219. It does not matter that claim preclusion also bars any causes of action arising out
of the same “transaction, or series of connected transactions,” that a plaintiff could have
asserted but did not. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1980); see also
United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1730 (2011) (referencing
Restatement rule as the “now-accepted test in preclusion”). We have already assumed
that the class asserts every cause of action it can.
220. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17, 27 (1980).
221. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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alleging that the factory’s employees were about to punch them in the
face, then settle the suit by allowing the employees to punch them in
the face. That complaint would have been improper, since its factual
allegations would have lacked “evidentiary support” and there would
have been no nonfrivolous argument for the legal claims arising out
of those allegations. The same goes, of course, for a complaint whose
relevant facts are the product of collusion, or for one that contains
factual and legal allegations that are obviously pretextual.
Unsupported matter included in the complaint solely to expand the
range of possible settlements must be stricken. 222
The second point requiring care is the task of determining the
scope of issue preclusion due to a hypothetical judgment. It is possible
for a judgment to have almost no issue-preclusive effect: e.g., a
holding that the defendant did not punch the plaintiff in the face on
January 3 will not dispose of any claims (over and above the ones
already taken care of by claim preclusion). But it is also possible for a
judgment to have substantial issue-preclusive effect. If a court holds
that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, holds good title to a parcel of
land, a wide range of actual and possible trespass claims will vanish all
at once. The outer limit of issue preclusion’s effect is therefore
determined by the fact-sensitive question of what issues could have
been resolved against the class in the underlying lawsuit. Where an
essential issue really could have been resolved against the class and
really would operate as a bar a future-conduct claim, the class can
properly release that claim in settlement. 223
B.

The Identical Factual Predicate Doctrine

The closest that the courts have come to this reasoning is to hold
that a class-action settlement may release claims if they arise out of an
“identical factual predicate” as the claims asserted in the underlying
lawsuit. 224 This doctrine is close enough to the parity of preclusion
222. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (allowing court to “strike from a pleading . . . any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” sua sponte).
223. It is possible to object to this rule on the ground that it encourages the defendant
to take aggressive action toward the class in order to increase the number of ripe issues
that can be settled. There are three replies. First, that same aggressive action will increase
the chances that the defendant will be sued by class representatives who will refuse to
settle, providing negative feedback on any increased tendency for the defendant to be
aggressive. Second, without a ripeness test, the defendant will never be exposed to any
legal risk at all, so imposing one increases the class’s leverage. And third, the parity of
preclusion rule cannot prevent all abuses of future-conduct releases by itself: that is why
courts must still apply a heightened scrutiny standard as well.
224. See, e.g., Hesse v. Spring Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2010); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 107 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of
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principle that it can and should be interpreted simply to embody the
principle. Indeed, a failure to recognize the general principle is the
source of the confusion infecting the identical-factual-predicate
doctrine. The courts have not clearly distinguished between the
effects of claim and issue preclusion. Instead, as this section explains,
they have pushed the logic of claim preclusion beyond what it can
reasonably bear in order to accommodate settlements that seem
unobjectionable.
The identical-factual-predicate doctrine emerged in National
Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange. 225 There, a pricefixing lawsuit over potato futures reached a settlement that covered
both the “liquidated” claims of traders who had sold their contracts at
a loss and the “unliquidated” claims of traders who had held onto
their contracts but never received the promised potatoes. 226 Since the
class representatives held only liquidated claims, the settlement could
easily have been rejected on conflict-of-interest grounds, but Judge
Friendly added:
If a judgment after trial cannot extinguish claims not asserted in
the class action complaint, a judgment approving a settlement
in such an action ordinarily should not be able to do so
either. . . . We assume that a settlement could properly be
framed so as to prevent class members from subsequently
asserting claims relying on a legal theory different from that
relied upon in the class action complaint but depending upon
the very same set of facts. This is not such a case. 227
This passage is a clear articulation of the close relationship between
adequate representation and preclusion. 228 Unfortunately, perhaps
because National Super Spuds was not a future-conduct case, Judge
Friendly drew only on the language of claim preclusion. “[D]epending

Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 367 (3d Cir. 2001). A particularly telling variation
comes from Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1992), which asked
whether the released and settled claims “arise from the same common nucleus of
operative fact.” Id. at 1288; see also In re Phila. Stock Exch., Inc., 945 A.2d 1123, 1146 n.48
(Del. 2008) (“Although the phraseology of these concepts (‘identical factual predicate’
and ‘same set of operative facts’) may be different, their substantive meaning is the
same.”). This is the language of supplemental jurisdiction, see United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), which reinforces the argument that parity of preclusion is
a jurisdictional limit on the federal courts, see infra Part IV.C.
225. 660 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1981).
226. See id. at 13–14.
227. Id. at 18 & n.7.
228. Cf. supra note 96 (discussing the binding nature of representational litigation).
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on the very same set of facts” focuses on the underlying facts of the
claims, much as claim preclusion does. 229
The phrase “identical factual predicate” in this context comes
from TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp. 230 In approving a
broad settlement of past-conduct claims, the court wrote:
We therefore conclude that in order to achieve a
comprehensive settlement that would prevent relitigation of
settled questions at the core of a class action, a court may
permit the release of a claim based on the identical factual
predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action
even though the claim was not presented and might not have
been presentable in the class action. 231
Here, although the court identifies a goal that sounds in issue
preclusion (“relitigation of settled questions”) the actual test uses
language that comes from claim preclusion (“identical factual
predicate”). This slippage is harmless for past-conduct cases, where
broad joinder rules mean that anything that was fair game for issue
preclusion will be fair game for claim preclusion as well. But it leads
to confusion in future-conduct cases. The problem is that focusing on
factual similarities, rather than legal similarities, provides little useful
guidance as to how far a chain of transactions can be stretched before
one of the links breaks.
The courts applying the identical factual predicate doctrine to
future-conduct cases have split on precisely this question. The
Delaware Chancery Court held that future conduct and past conduct
could never share an identical factual predicate: “If the facts have not
yet occurred, then they cannot possibly be the basis for the underlying
action.” 232 But the Second Circuit held that it is “not improper” to
release claims for future infringements as long as the complaint
“contemplates these alleged future injuries.” 233 The Restatement
explains that the concept of “transaction” is “to be determined
pragmatically,” 234 but the courts do not have a good sense of which

229. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1980) (barring claims
“with respect to . . . the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the
action arose”).
230. 675 F.2d 456 (2d Cir. 1982).
231. Id. at 460.
232. Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 898 A.2d 344, 347 (Del. Ch. 2006).
233. In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 248 (2d
Cir. 2011).
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1980).
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factors are relevant when contemplating a future-conduct release. 235
Parity of preclusion supplies the answer.
C.

Doctrinal Justification

Thus far, the case for parity of preclusion has been intuitive
rather than doctrinally rigorous. While the identical factual predicate
doctrine offers an obvious basis for parity of preclusion, the doctrine
itself has never been rigorously grounded. It is general common law,
followed by both federal and state courts, but with no explicit basis in
constitution, statute, or rule. For some readers, this will be sufficient
to justify the principle as a prudential judge-made doctrine. This
section will provide a more rigorous foundation for those readers who
want one.
The basic structure of the argument is simple: unlitigable class
claims are by definition outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts
over class actions. 236 The contrast to individual releases, which are
effective as a matter of contract law, is instructive. Even when the
court enters a contract as a judgment to facilitate enforcement, it is
enforcing a private contract. Class-action settlements are not and
cannot be contracts, because class representatives are authorized to
litigate on behalf of their fellows, not to negotiate contracts. The only
way to make a release binding on a class is for the court to use its
judgment power—and that it cannot do unless it has jurisdiction over
the released claims in the first place. Article III’s constitutional limit
on federal jurisdiction, statutory limits on federal jurisdiction, and
Rule 23’s limits on which class actions can be certified by a federal
court all point in the same direction. Unlitigable claims are
unsettleable because they are categorically unripe.
For space reasons, this Article discusses only federal doctrines
that would limit future-conduct releases. But all the same normative
arguments apply to state courts, and doctrinally, state jurisdiction is
not a free-for-all. States may have broader conceptions of what they
consider to be a justiciable case, states may have courts of general
235. See generally Mary Kay Kane, Original Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil
Procedure, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1723 (1998) (discussing multiple meanings of “transaction”
standard and emphasizing its flexibility).
236. This is not the only parity-based bright-line jurisdictional limit on future-conduct
releases one could attempt to defend. Another approach would focus on future parties
rather than on future-conduct claims. See Schuwerk, supra note 9, at 227. On this theory,
future-conduct releases could not bind individuals who were not part of the class at the
time of the settlement. The problem with such an approach is that it draws arbitrary
distinctions based on whether parties are part of a class for unrelated reasons. A claimbased approach more properly focuses on the actual content of the releases.
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subject-matter jurisdiction, and states may have fewer prerequisites to
class certification. But the states do still have limits: some matters are
too abstract and unripe to present cases their courts will entertain,
and some classes are too diffuse for them to certify. The point of
parity of preclusion is that wherever a jurisdiction sets those limits,
they should apply equally in litigation and in settlement.
1. Article III Jurisdiction
Novel future-conduct claims are unripe. 237 They do not present a
litigable case or controversy; the federal courts have no jurisdiction
over them. 238 Courts do not magically acquire such jurisdiction
237. One could also try to analyze the issue in terms of the related doctrine of Article
III standing. Cf., e.g., Gaston, supra note 9, at 223–24 (discussing limitations on standing
for class action claimants with regard to future injuries). Indeed, standing and ripeness
“are closely related, most notably in the shared requirement that the injury be imminent
rather than conjectural or hypothetical.” Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. B v. Legal Servs.
Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2006). But ripeness, which controls when a claim can be
brought, is a better fit for future-conduct releases than standing, which controls who can
bring the claim.
Martin Redish and Andrianna D. Kastanek have argued that settlement class
actions in general violate Article III because they are non-adversarial. Martin H. Redish &
Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement,
and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 550–51 (2006). This
position has not carried the day in the courts, but it applies with even greater force to
novel future-conduct settlements, where the claims being settled not only are not being
litigated but could not be litigated. Here, however, the lack of an adversarial case is a
function of the lack of ripeness, rather than vice-versa.
238. Cf. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 71 n.3 (1976) (explaining that the district court
lacks jurisdiction over class members who “will be denied enrollment’ ” in Medicare)
(quoting Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 1, 7 (S.D. Fla. 1973)). Matthews involved
administrative exhaustion, but other cases have issued similar holdings as a matter of
Article III. See, e.g., Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, No. 8:09-cv-923-T-23EAJ, 2010 WL
917609, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2010) (“Furthermore, the plaintiffs cannot assert a claim
on behalf of a nonexistent member of the class who, at some hypothetical time in the
future, ‘will be’ homeless and ‘would be’ subject to any of the City's alleged ‘policies,
practices[,] or customs.’ ” (internal citation omitted)); Minority Police Officers Ass’n of S.
Bend v. S. Bend, 555 F. Supp. 921, 924–25 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (holding no jurisdiction to
include future minority police officers in employment discrimination case), aff’d in part,
appeal dismissed in part, 721 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1983). While other courts do sometimes
certify classes including future class members, see, e.g., Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v.
McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1335 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing previous class of “all Haitian aliens
who are currently detained or who will in the future be detained” (emphasis added)), such
classes are frequently open to subsequent challenge by class members, see, e.g., id. at 1337–
38 (rejecting preclusive effect of prior class action against class members on multiple
grounds). Such certifications are unnecessary to vindicate the rights of future claimants; a
better model is to treat them as beneficiaries of a favorable outcome for the class, while
allowing the defendant to rely only on the weaker effect of stare decisis rather than res
judicata to bind them to an unfavorable result. See, e.g., South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 614
(7th Cir. 1985) (allowing intervention by formerly future class member); Kaczynski, supra
note 9, at 411–12.
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because the claims arrive at the clerk’s office on a piece of paper
labeled “Proposed Settlement Agreement” rather than one labeled
“Complaint.”
This argument does not depend on any particular theory of how
far Article III extends. You and I may disagree on which claims
actually are ripe, and why. But once we agree that a claim could not
be litigated, and that it is so different in kind from any claims that
could be litigated that it cannot be precluded by them, we have
already decided that it is outside Article III’s ambit. 239 Whatever
ripeness’s limit is, it applies equally in litigation, in preclusion, and in
settlement. In a settlement, the parties will all be urging approval, but
the court “cannot rely upon concessions of the parties and must
determine whether the issues are ripe for decision in the ‘Case or
Controversy’ sense.” 240
Nor is Article III satisfied with respect to future-conduct claims
just because some other claims do present a live case or controversy.
If you breach a contract with me, I can sue you for the breach. But I
cannot also sue to enjoin you from burning down my house. My
hypothetical claims against you for the house-burning are not part of
the same Article III case or controversy as my contract claims. 241 So
too with future-conduct settlements. The court does not acquire
jurisdiction over unlitigable future-conduct claims merely because it
has jurisdiction over some other, genuine claims by the class.
Indeed, the policies behind the case or controversy requirement
are the same ones counseling caution about future-conduct releases.
Deferring decisions until better factual information is available about
their consequences? 242 Check. 243 Letting individuals make their own

239. See, e.g. Schuwerk, supra note 9, at 81 (“To the extent those claims have not
matured by the time of the court’s ruling, they never ripen into the concrete adverseness
necessary for a justiciable case or controversy and the court never acquires jurisdiction to
pass upon them.”)
240. Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974).
241. Standing doctrine is instructive here. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S.
332, 352 (2006) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to
press.”). This policy appeals to—indeed, derives from—considerations of ripeness. See id.
(holding that a broader definition of standing would mean that “a federal court would be
free to entertain moot or unripe claims”); cf. Pagán v. Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir.
2006) (“The standing inquiry is both plaintiff-specific and claim-specific.”).
242. See WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532.2 (3d ed.
2011) (“[T]he central concern of [ripeness] is that the tendered claim involves uncertain
and contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at
all.”).
243. See supra Part II.A–B.
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decisions? 244 Check. 245 Separation of powers? 246 Check. 247 “[R]ipeness
is peculiarly a question of timing.” 248 It requires courts to wait to
decide a claim until it is properly presented, and that is exactly what
parity of preclusion accomplishes. It does not keep these matters out
of the courts forever, but only until such time as there is a genuine
legal dispute about them. 249
2. Statutory Jurisdiction
Parity of preclusion is also a limit on the statutory jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Congress has not even attempted to confer
jurisdiction over novel future-conduct claims. Where a district court
lacks original jurisdiction over a future-conduct claim standing on its
own, there is no provision of federal law that confers such jurisdiction
merely because it is included in a class-action settlement.
Supplemental jurisdiction extends only to claims that “form part of
the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution” as a claim over which the court has original
jurisdiction. 250 Similarly the Declaratory Judgment Act limits itself to
“a case of actual controversy” that is already “within [the court’s]
jurisdiction,” 251 thereby incorporating the Article III limit.
Nor do the Federal Rules attempt to confer such jurisdiction.
Rule 82 is crystal-clear: the Federal Rules “do not extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the district courts[.]” 252 There is no exception for class
244. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or
Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 310–15 (1979).
245. See supra Part II.D.
246. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (stating that a “basic
rationale” of ripeness is “to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an
administrative decision has been formalized”).
247. See supra Part II.E.
248. Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974).
249. One might object that a person considering an action that might be held to
infringe a group’s rights would be unwilling to take the steps that would create a ripe
question, and therefore the issue would never come before the courts. So, for example, if
Alice is considering putting up a factory but is afraid her neighbors will sue for nuisance,
she might never make the investment without an advance settlement to insulate her from
liability, and so the issue will never come before a court at all. But we have already made
that decision. We made it when we refused to let the neighbors sue Alice in advance,
because the issue was unripe. And we made it again when we refused to let Alice bring a
declaratory judgment action against the class, again because the issue was unripe. All that
parity of preclusion requires is that we repeat this decision for settlements as well as
lawsuits. Claims that are unripe in the one are unripe in the other.
250. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
251. Id. § 2201(a) .
252. FED R. CIV. P. 82. By way of contrast, the Rules Enabling Act’s famous proviso
that the Rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” 28 U.S.C.
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actions or for settlements. A court that lacks jurisdiction over a claim
in class-action litigation does not magically acquire jurisdiction
because the class action settles.
3. Rule 23
Rule 23 itself does not allow novel future-conduct claims to be
part of a class action. A settlement-only class action may not
circumvent the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a)(2). 253 A class
can be certified only with respect to “common questions of law or
fact.” 254 Novel future-conduct claims present neither. There are no
common questions of fact because there cannot be: there are no facts
about the conduct yet, only possibilities. 255 And there are no common
questions of law because the legal claims are unripe. If there were a
common, ripe issue of law shared by the class, then issue preclusion
could apply. 256
Other parts of Rule 23 reinforce the interpretation that the
phrase “common questions of law or fact” in 23(a)(2) refers only to
actual, litigable claims and genuine, present issues of law. The “claims
or defenses of the representative parties” can only be typical if class
§ 2072(b) (2006), does not provide an independent limit on the settlement of novel futureconduct claims. A broad settlement power may be an arbitrary and unfair delegation to
class counsel of the procedural ability to compromise substantive rights, but it does not
itself abridge them. While others have raised Rules Enabling Act objections to expansive
class actions, see, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Derek T. Apanovitch, The Constitutional
Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under
Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 492–93 (1997); Martin H. Redish & Uma M.
Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the Federal
Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1314–15 (2006), in
the words of Rocket J. Squirrel, “But that trick never works.” The Supreme Court has
been notably unreceptive to arguments that provisions of the Federal Rules exceed the
authority delegated by Congress in the Act. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 (2010) (holding that Rule 23 is within the scope of
the Rules Enabling Act even when it conflicts with a state law prohibiting certain forms of
class actions). But see Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (invoking Rules
Enabling Act as support for narrow construction of Rule 23).
253. Amchem Prods, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–22 (1997).
254. FED R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
255. See James Grimmelmann, Three Theories of Copyright in Ratings, 14 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 851, 877 (2012) (discussing existential status of “facts” about future
events).
256. Of course, a class concerned about future conduct may share some common
factual and legal questions. So, for example, a group of individuals with a shared disease
who are concerned about working conditions at a proposed factory may have in common
the question of whether the disease qualifies as a “disability” under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006). But this question can only be resolved in a
lawsuit properly presenting it: a lawsuit about conditions at an actual factory, not a purely
hypothetical one. The same limit applies to settlements.
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members have “claims” in the first place. 257 It only makes sense for
the court to “define . . . the class claims, issues, or defenses” if the
class action will actually be limited to those “claims, issues, or
defenses.” 258 And the class action will result in a “judgment”: i.e., the
exercise of the court’s adjudicatory power. 259 Rule 23 treats the class
action as a mechanism for aggregating existing, litigable claims; novel
future-conduct releases transgress that limit. 260
D. Answering Doctrinal Objections
This section answers two objections to the jurisdictional
justification for parity of preclusion. Both of them claim that federal
courts routinely approve settlements that would be flatly illegal under
parity of preclusion. Some cases, like Firefighters, approve
settlements that provide broader relief than would have been
available at trial. Others, like the Supreme Court’s Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 261 approve settlements that release claims
that could never have been heard in the forum court at all. Neither
objection is on point; understanding why requires closer attention to
the cases in question.
1. Remedies Not Available at Trial
The first objection is that some cases approve consent decrees, as
in Firefighters, that “provide[] broader relief than the court could

257. FED R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
258. FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B); see also id. 23(c)(2)(B)(iii) (requiring notice of “the
class claims, issues, or defenses”; id. 23(e) (allowing settlement of “[t]he claims, issues, or
defenses”). Adam Milasincic argues that Rule 23(c)(1)(B) is an “easy-to-satisfy
administrative instruction” intended only to “separat[e] the certified from the
noncertified,” but even this Rule 23(c)(1)(B) minimalist accepts by assumption that the
class action must actually be confined to “claims, issues, or defenses.” Adam Milasincic,
Note, Disorder Certifying a Class: Misinterpretations of Rule 23(c)(1)(B) and a Proposed
Alternative, 97 VA. L. REV. 979, 1006, 1017 (2011).
259. FED R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (“class judgment”); id. 23(c)(3) (“judgment”); id.
23(d)(1)(B)(ii) (notice of “proposed extent of the judgment”).
260. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1443 (2010) (“A class action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a species),
merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of
in separate suits.”). Scholars presently debate the extent to which the class is more than
just a scaled-up version of joinder. See generally Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions:
Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459 (1983) (exploring “broad
patterns” of the joinder and representational models of class actions); Alexandra D.
Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939 (2011) (discussing
“aggregation” versus “entity” views of class actions); Redish & Kastanek, supra note 237
(objecting to class actions as qualitatively different from conjoined individual lawsuits).
261. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
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have awarded after a trial.” 262 If courts have jurisdiction to award
broader remedies, why not to impose broader releases? For example,
in Sansom Committee. v. Lynn, 263 the Third Circuit approved a
consent decree that was “several hundred pages long and set[] out
precise specifications for everything from the type of stone and wood
that [could] be used in rehabilitating the houses to . . . methods of
vermin control and refuse disposal.” 264
The answer is simply that remedies and releases really are
different. “Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of
a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” 265 The
concerns that limit the application of this equitable power—such as
federalism and separation of powers 266—are substantially weaker in
consent decrees because the defendant has individually agreed to
waive such protections. 267 As long as the remedies “spring from and
serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction” 268 the court has the power to put them in a consent
decree. 269 Releases for novel future-conduct claims, on the other
hand, “resolve” nothing: the entire point of the discussion above is
that they deal with nonjusticiable claims outside the court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction. 270

262. Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525
(1986); see also supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text.
263. 735 F.2d 1535 (Becker, J., concurring).
264. Id. at 1543 n.4: see also Brief of Google in Support, supra note 36, at 9 (quoting
Sansom).
265. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
266. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 124–33 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(giving history of structural injunction jurisprudence and arguing for narrower judicial
equitable powers).
267. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525 (“However, in addition to the law which forms the
basis of the claim, the parties’ consent animates the legal force of a consent decree.”).
268. Id.
269. The same is true of the numerous other cases cited by Google and the plaintiffs in
Authors Guild. Cases that actually involve promises made to the class include Frew v.
Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004); Jeff D. v. Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2004);
Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1989); Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1485
(10th Cir. 1989); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir.
1987); Miller v. Woodmoor Corp., No 74-F-988, 1978 WL 1146 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 1978);
and Levin v. Mississippi River Corp., 59 F.R.D. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Google and the
Authors Guild plaintiffs cited two Rule 23(b)(1) cases, both of which required stringent
prerequisites to ensure that the future-conduct claims being released had been at stake in
the underlying lawsuits challenging the professional leagues’ draft systems. See White v.
Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1390 (D. Minn. 1993); Robertson v. Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n, 72 F.R.D. 64, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff’d 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
270. See supra Parts IV.C.1–.2.
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2. Multi-Jurisdiction Releases
The second objection is that the Supreme Court in Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein 271 approved:
the release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as
that underlying the claims in the settled class action even
though the claim was not presented and might not have been
presentable in the class action. 272
At first blush, this language seems inconsistent with parity of
preclusion: it permits the settlement of claims that perhaps could not
have been litigated. But there is a subtle difference, related to why
those claims could not have been presented. The quoted language
comes originally from TBK Partners v. Western Union Corp. 273 The
class action there was a suit in federal court under the federal
securities laws, but the settlement would also have released appraisal
claims arising under New York law that were (allegedly) subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of New York state courts. 274 These state
claims were based on the same factual allegations as the federal
claims—an alleged failure to preserve a separate corporate identity
following a long-term lease of all corporate assets that was in effect a
merger—but they could not have been presented in the federal
action. 275 Matsushita presented the reverse situation: the release of
exclusively federal claims in state courts. 276
In both situations, the claim itself is justiciable, but a rule of
subject-matter jurisdiction has allocated the claim to a different court.
These rules advance policies of federalism and of orderly division of
responsibilities within a court system; they keep courts from stepping
on each other’s toes. These policies are important in litigation; much
less so in settlement. There is no useful purpose to be served in
making the parties who are filing a settlement in one court walk down
the street to file a second set of paperwork in another court.
Because the purpose of parity of preclusion is to prevent the
settlement of unlitigable claims, it makes sense to adopt this generous
attitude toward which claims (and issues) are capable of being
litigated. For a class-action settlement to release a claim, it is enough
271. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
272. Id. at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted).
273. See 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982).
274. Id. at 458–60.
275. See id.
276. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 367. Matsushita itself can be distinguished on a second
ground: it was decided as a matter of statutory full faith and credit and so did not truly
confront the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 373.
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that it could be precluded by a class action in any court, not just by a
class action in the forum court. 277 These claims are effectively litigable
in the other court; indeed, they could be settled there. A settlement in
the forum court should also be able to release them.
The harder part is explaining why such releases do not violate
the jurisdictional arguments given above. A claim that could not have
been brought in a forum for reasons of subject-matter jurisdiction
cannot be precluded under claim preclusion. 278 But parity of
preclusion embraces issue preclusion as well, and issue preclusion is
more willing to consider the policies underlying the allocation of
jurisdiction among courts. 279 Matsushita illustrates precisely how this
flexibility can work: in considering the preclusive effect Delaware
would give to a settlement entered by one of its courts, the Supreme
Court explicitly thought through the federalism polices at stake and
Delaware’s judgments about the authority vested in its courts. 280 TBK
Partners did much the same in reverse, and even identified the
common essential issue: “the correct valuation of whatever
reversionary interest was owed to Gold & Stock’s shareholders.” 281
This is the correct approach.
E.

Normative Justification

Informally, parity-of-preclusion means that future-conduct
claims may be released only when they are closely connected to
something the defendant has already done. This restriction addresses
many of the normative concerns with future-conduct releases
identified in Part II. It does not address them completely, so there is
still also a need for heightened Rule 23(e)(2) scrutiny. But it does so
effectively enough that parity-of-preclusion marks a normatively
attractive dividing line between potentially permissible futureconduct releases and absolutely forbidden ones. Once again, it is
helpful to group the analysis by those normative concerns.

277. But see Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 274 (7th Cir.
1998) (reading TBK Partners and other cases “as pertaining broadly to the law of
‘releases’ rather than narrowly to the issue of federal court jurisdiction”). Williams is
discussed on other grounds and criticized herein. See infra Part V.C.
278. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1980).
279. Id. § 28(3) (explaining that preclusive effect depends on “differences in the quality
or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts or by factors relating to the
allocation of jurisdiction between them”).
280. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 377–79, 382–83.
281. TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460–61 (2d Cir. 1982).
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1. High Stakes
It is almost tautological that parity of preclusion can only reduce
the stakes of potential settlements. If a given claim was at risk in
litigation, then the stakes are already high enough to include it. True,
a complaint can be drafted broadly, but we tolerate broad complaints
in litigation already 282 and trust courts to ensure that class members
are adequately represented to the extent of those claims. 283 If the
scope of settlement authority were narrower, counsel could have the
incentive to litigate weak and risky claims rather than accepting a
beneficial settlement. Moreover there are still limits on even a
broadly drafted complaint. 284 There is no way that authors and
publishers could have lost the right to stop Google from selling
complete copies of their books, no matter how broad their pleadings.
For one thing, since Google did not sell and was not about to sell
complete books, such claims would have been categorically unripe. 285
For another, the infringement case would have been so unequivocal
that a court could easily conclude that there was no colorable risk of
loss. 286
2. Uncertainty
Grounding future-conduct releases in the defendant’s past
conduct introduces specificity: we can better anticipate the future if
we know that it will be like the past. This makes it easier to predict
the relevant conduct and its consequences, thereby helping counsel,
class members, and the court. They can look at what the defendant
has already been doing to guess what it will do in the future. It is
much easier to feel comfortable about a settlement allowing Google
282. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a) (permitting a party to join in one complaint “as many
claims as it has against an opposing party”).
283. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (establishing standards for the appointment of class
counsel, including that counsel will “fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
class”).
284. See supra Part IV.A (discussing pleading doctrines).
285. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 11 CV 6351(HB), 2012 WL 4808939, at
*7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012) (holding that claims against Google’s library partners for
cancelled plan to distribute complete copies of books were unripe); Authors Guild v.
Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Google did not scan the books to
make them available for purchase . . . .”).
286. Indeed, the Authors Guild court did just that. Authors Guild, 770 F.Supp.2d at 678
(“Google would have no colorable defense to a claim of infringement based on the
unauthorized copying and selling or other exploitation of entire copyrighted books.”); see
also Transcript of Fairness Hearing, supra note 87, at 150 (“THE COURT: If Google had
been digitizing entire books and not just making portions available but making the entire
portions available and indeed selling them, would that be something that Google would
have tried to defend? MS. DURIE: Selling the work, no.”).
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to create a search index than about one allowing it to sell books. The
search index Google has spent the last seven years building is a very
good illustration of how a search index would work, whereas basic
features of the proposed bookstore and subscription service were still
giant question marks as of the time the settlement was rejected. Past
performance is no guarantee of future results, but it is better than
past nothing.
3. Moral Hazard
It is harder to set up perverse incentives if one does not have
novel conduct to work with. The question to class members is simply
whether they will be able to tolerate what the defendant is already
doing and, if so, at what price. The court can similarly have more
confidence that the arrangement it is blessing is not unduly
dangerous, if it has managed to exist already without problem.
Moreover, a defendant seeking to undertake an activity will need to
be prepared to actually engage in the activity, without the cover of
the settlement, and risk the consequences. This skin in the game gives
the class more negotiating leverage because it leaves litigation as a
credible threat. 287
4. Concentrated Power
Future-conduct releases can still give a defendant concentrated
power, but with parity of preclusion, that power is limited to the
continuation of the power the defendant has already claimed. This
pulls potential challenges forward in time: for example, antitrust suits
by third parties need not wait until after the settlement. Parity also
assists the defendant’s competitors, because if the defendant could
have obtained the rights it seeks through litigation, anyone similarly
situated could do likewise. This was one of the key defects of the
Google Books settlement: it created a legal platform that was usable
only by Google and not available to other book scanning
institutions. 288

287. Cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997) (“Class counsel
confined to settlement negotiations could not use the threat of litigation to press for a
better offer.”). Crucially, this alternative would also produce the attorney’s fees needed to
motivate class counsel to consider litigation instead of settlement.
288. See generally Grimmelmann, supra note 128 (discussing obstacles standing in the
way of potential competitors looking to establish similar programs).
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5. Separation of Powers
Tying future-conduct releases to the scope of litigation
immediately brings them back to the core judicial function: the
resolution of disputes. The decisions of the legislature are still given
effect through the bodies of law that shape and constrain the
underlying lawsuit. The resulting settlements may have substantial
prospective effects and apply broadly, but they are no longer wholly
untethered from legislative enactments. A class-action lawsuit gives
the court license to settle that lawsuit, rather than being an excuse to
get the parties into court and play Let’s Make a Deal.
V. APPLICATIONS
Not only are heightened scrutiny and parity-of-preclusion
normatively attractive when considered in the abstract, they also yield
sensible results when applied to specific cases. This Part considers a
test suite of seven actual settlements containing future-conduct
releases. In each case, applying this Article’s recommendations—
heightened scrutiny and parity-of-preclusion—yields doctrinally and
normatively appealing results for clearer and more generalizable
reasons than the courts themselves have given.
A. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.
Parity of preclusion asks whether the plaintiff authors and
publishers could have lost in litigation their future-conduct claims
against Google for selling complete books. The answer is clearly
“no,” and Authors Guild supplies a clear, cogent explanation of why.
The underlying lawsuit did not bring claims predicated on a theory of
infringement for selling complete books:
This case was brought to challenge Google’s use of “snippets,”
as plaintiffs alleged that Google’s scanning of books and display
of snippets for online searching constituted copyright
infringement. . . . There was no allegation that Google was
making full books available online, and the case was not about
full access to copyrighted works. 289

289. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 678. Indeed, now that the case has returned to
litigation, the Authors Guild does not allege that Google sells complete books. See
Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (redacted), Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No.
1:05-CV-08136-DC), ECF No. 1054 ¶ 53 (“Google has digitally copied over four million
in-copyright English language books[;] . . . distributed complete digital copies of over 2.7
million of in-copyright books to libraries[;] . . . and displayed verbatim expression as
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More importantly, the plaintiffs could not have brought claims
predicated on such a theory:
Google did not scan the books to make them available for
purchase, and indeed, Google would have no colorable defense
to a claim of copyright infringement based on the unauthorized
copying and selling or other exploitation of entire copyrighted
books. Yet, the ASA would grant Google the right to sell full
access to copyrighted works that it would otherwise have no
right to exploit. 290
Taken together, these two points show that the parity-of-preclusion
test unambiguously forbade the settlement. There was no plausible
way that Google’s conduct in scanning and indexing books could have
put in play the class’s future claims for future sales of complete books.
No possible fair use victory in the underlying lawsuit could have given
Google the rights the settlement conferred on it, because the scope of
the fair use defense is tied to specific uses. It would have been
evaluated as to the display of snippets, not as to the sale of complete
books. Authors Guild thus reaches the right result.
Unfortunately because the court was saddled with the identical
factual predicate doctrine, it surrounded these two passages with
other statements whose relationship to the core preclusion issue is
less clear. The court gave this discussion of the “scope of the
pleadings”:
The parties argue that the pleadings are not limited to
plaintiffs’ claims with respect to the display of snippets, citing
the Third Amended Complaint. While it is true that the
pleadings refer to broader conduct (including the creation of
‘‘digital copies’’ of books), the copying and display of
copyrighted material occurred in the context of ‘‘Google Book
Search,’’ which ‘‘is designed to allow users to search the text of
books online. The digital archiving of the Books that are the
subject of this lawsuit was undertaken by Google as part of
Google Book Search.’’ 291
This passage was a nonresponsive answer to an irrelevant argument.
It does not matter that the complaint went beyond scanning and
snippet display if Google’s past conduct did not put the legality of
full-text sales in play. To the extent that the complaint objected to
snippets from millions of in-copyright books over the Internet in response to search
requests from its users.”).
290. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 678.
291. Id. (citations omitted).
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full-text sales, it raised only unripe, nonjusticiable claims. That the
scanning and snippet display took place “in the context of ‘Google
Book Search’ ” 292 says nothing, by itself, about what legal issues the
suit raised.
Similarly, the court went on to write:
The ASA would grant Google control over the digital
commercialization of millions of books, including orphan books
and other unclaimed works. And it would do so even though
Google engaged in wholesale, blatant copying, without first
obtaining copyright permissions. While its competitors went
through the ‘‘painstaking’’ and ‘‘costly’’ process of obtaining
permissions before scanning copy- righted books, ‘‘Google by
comparison took a shortcut by copying anything and everything
regardless of copyright status.’’ As one objector put it: ‘‘Google
pursued its copyright project in calculated disregard of authors’
rights. Its business plan was: ‘So, sue me.’ ” 293
The tone of moral condemnation was understandable, if
unwarranted—but the idea that Google should not be rewarded for
its “shortcut” was exactly backwards. The problem with the
settlement was that it went beyond the underlying lawsuit. If Google
had not scanned books at all, the settlement would have been even
more unwarranted, more hypothetical, more disconnected from the
lawsuit. The court should have been more concerned that Google was
trying to get the benefits of a full-books settlement without exposing
itself to any meaningful risk, than that Google acted too aggressively
in scanning books.
The parity-of-preclusion principle shows that a narrower
settlement of the case could have included some future-conduct
elements. 294 Imagine a scanning-and-snippets settlement: one that
allows Google to scan books, build a search index, and show snippets
to users, in exchange for some compensation to class members. Such
a settlement would pass muster under the parity-of-preclusion test,
because these are precisely the activities it has been engaged in for
the last eight years. If Google wins its pending motion for summary
judgment on its fair use defense, it will be legally entitled to keep on

292. Id.
293. Id. at 678–79 (citations omitted).
294. See Statement of Interest II, supra note 11, at 8 (“[A] properly defined and
adequately represented class of copyright holders may be able to settle a lawsuit over past
conduct by licensing a somewhat broader range of conduct.”).
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scanning and indexing books. 295 Thus, future conduct raising the same
legal issues—scanning, indexing, and snippet display—would properly
be within the scope of a revised settlement.
Events following the settlement’s rejection illustrate how little
parity of preclusion interferes with normal class-action litigation. In
December 2011, the author plaintiffs moved for class certification. 296
Even though the court had previously held in rejecting the settlement
that “the class plaintiffs ha[d] not adequately represented the
interests of at least certain class members[,]” 297 it granted class
certification, holding that a subset of those lead plaintiffs would be
“adequate representatives of the class.” 298 There is no contradiction.
The Authors Guild’s handpicked plaintiffs are adequate
representatives to vindicate class members’ existing rights. They are
not adequate representatives to negotiate a forward-looking
publishing deal through a settlement. No one is.
A ruling in a closely related case in October 2012 also
underscores the point that scanning and indexing were genuinely at
stake but that full-text sales were not. The Authors Guild also sued
Google’s library partners in a case with the caption of Authors Guild,
Inc. v. HathiTrust. 299 Four of the libraries had announced an Orphan
Works Project, which would have created a process to flag certain
books as being orphans, and then made digital copies of those books
available to library patrons. 300 After authors noticed serious problems
with the libraries’ processes—the initial list of “orphans” included
Walter Lippman’s The Communist World and Ours 301—but before
any of the books were actually made available, the libraries

295. See Defendant Google Inc.’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Its Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Summary Adjudication,
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 05 CV 8136DC), ECF No. 1032.
296. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification,
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), appeal docketed, No. 123200 (2nd Cir. Aug. 14, 2012) (Nos. 05 Civ. 8136 (DC), 10 Civ. 2977 (DC)), ECF No. 990.
297. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d. at 679.
298. Authors Guild, 282 F.R.D. at 394. But see Order of Aug. 14, 2012, Authors Guild,
__ F.3d __ (No. 12-2402) (granting Google permission to appeal class certification).
299. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 11 CV 6351(HB), 2012 WL 4808939, at *1–
3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012).
300. Id. at *2.
301. Orphan Row: Now It’s Your Turn, AUTHORS GUILD (Sept. 14, 2011), http://blog.
authorsguild.org/2011/09/14/orphan-row-now-its-your-turn-2/; Found One! We Re-Unite an
Author with an “Orphaned Work,” AUTHORS GUILD (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://blog.authorsguild.org/2011/09/14/found-one-we-re-unite-an-author-with-an%E2%80%9Corphaned-work-%E2%80%9D/.
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suspended the Orphan Works Project. 302 The Authors Guild and
other authors’ groups sued the libraries over the Orphan Works
Project and also over their use of digital copies given to them by
Google to create a search engine. 303 The court held that the search
engine was a fair use 304 but refused to pass on the Orphan Works
Project, which it held was unripe for adjudication. 305 In other words,
as a result of the HathiTrust litigation, the plaintiffs have lost the right
to object to the libraries’ use of scans to provide a search engine, but
not the right to object if the libraries in the future start making full
books available. 306 This distinction is essentially the same one the
Authors Guild court made in the context of a settlement; both courts
got it right.
B.

In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright
Litigation

The Literary Works opinion grew out of a cluster of lawsuits
informally known as the “freelancers” suits. Where the Google Books
suit is about databases of books; the freelancers suits were about
databases of articles. In the 1970s and 1980s, periodicals began
licensing their articles to electronic databases. 307 While the details
varied substantially, most of the databases treated the article as the
fundamental unit: users searched for and read individual articles,
rather than reading through an issue from one page to the next. 308 In
302. U-M Library Statement on the Orphan Works Project, MLIBRARY (Sept. 16,
2011), http://www.lib.umich.edu/news/u-m-library-statement-orphan-works-project.
303. HathiTrust, 2012 WL 4808939, at *3.
304. Id. at *10–14.
305. Id. at *7–8.
306. Two qualifications should be noted. First, the court did allow the libraries to make
full-text books available to the print-disabled, but this part of the holding was confined to
the print-disabled, as there was no suggestion that the libraries had made the books
available to anyone else. Id. at *15. Second, as of this writing, the case has been appealed
to the Second Circuit. Notice of Appeal, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 1:11-cv06351-HB (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 2012).
307. See generally MICHAEL A. BANKS, ON THE WAY TO THE WEB 63–73 (2008)
(discussing 1980s movement toward full-text online availability and royalties issues);
CHARLES P. BOURNE & TRUDI BELLARDO HAHN, A HISTORY OF ONLINE
INFORMATION SERVICES, 1963-1976, at 366–68 (2003) (discussing 1970s development of
online databases and licensing issues). Debates over copyright issues followed the creation
of these databases even before they offered full-text downloads. See Kristin R.
Eschenfelder, Anuj C. Desai, & Greg Downey, The Pre-Internet Downloading
Controversy: The Evolution of Use Rights for Digital Intellectual and Cultural Works, 27
INFO. SOC’Y 69, 74–75 (2011).
308. See Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 808–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
[hereinafter Tasini I], rev’d, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Tasini II], aff’d, 533
U.S. 483 (2001) [hereinafter Tasini III].
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the early 1990s, freelancers and the periodicals began to spar over
whether their contracts (many of which were oral) allowed such
licensing. 309
In the first round of litigation, six freelance authors led by
Jonathan Tasini sued the New York Times, Newsday, and Sports
Illustrated for licensing their articles to various databases. 310 In 2001,
the Supreme Court agreed 7–2 with the freelancers, opening the
floodgates. 311 Three different groups of freelancers filed putative class
actions against various electronic databases, 312 which were
consolidated in the Southern District of New York. 313 While the
freelancers had a strong case post-Tasini, it was not completely openand-shut, in part because different publishers had used different
contract forms. After three years of mediation, the parties announced
a proposed settlement in March 2005. 314
The basic structure of the settlement was comparatively simple.
Like the Google Books settlement, it contained both a release for
past infringements and one for future infringements. 315 Looking back,
the databases and the publishers would have been forgiven for their
past uses of class members’ articles. 316 Looking forward, the databases
would have been allowed to continue including class members’
articles under their licenses from the publishers. 317 In return, the
309. See, e.g., Tasini I, at 807 (describing contracts entered into by defendants);
Deirdre Carmody, Writers Fight for Electronic Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994, at B20
(reporting on copyrights dispute).
310. See Tasini I, 972 F. Supp. at 807.
311. See Tasini III, 533 U.S. at 506.
312. Posner v. Gale Group, Inc., No. 00-cv-07376 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 28, 2000); Laney
v. Dow Jones & Co., No. 00-cv-00769 (D. Del. filed Aug. 22, 2000); Authors Guild v.
Dialog Corp., No. 00-cv-06049 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 15, 2000). The alert reader will have
noted that these filing dates predate the Supreme Court’s decision in Tasini III. The suits
were filed following the Second Circuit’s decision in favor of the freelancers in Tasini II,
but were stayed pending the Supreme Court’s decision. See In re Literary Works in Elec.
Databases Copyright Litig., 2001 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 33406, 33408 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
313. See In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 2001 Copyright L.
Dec. (CCH) 33147, 33148 (J.P.M.L. 2000). One of the many ironies of these cases is that
the National Writers Union and American Society of Journalists and Authors were coplaintiffs with the Authors Guild in the consolidated freelancers suit and objectors to the
Authors Guild-led Google Books settlement. See id.
314. See Settlement Agreement Dated March 31, 2005, In re Literary Works in Elec.
Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242 (2nd Cir. 2011) (Nos. 05–5943–cv(L), 06–0223),
reprinted in Joint Appendix at 107, Reed Elsevier Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010)
(No. 08-103), 2009 WL 1423539, at *107.
315. See id. § 1.n, at *113–15.
316. See id. (past uses); id. § 5.b at *127–28 (future uses).
317. As in the Google Books settlement, freelancer class members who remained in
the class could choose to deny permission for future uses of their works. If they did so,
however, their compensation would be reduced by thirty five percent. Id. § 5.a, at *127.
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publishers and databases would have created a settlement fund of
between $10 million and $18 million to be paid to copyright owners. 318
Owners of articles that had been registered with the Copyright Office
would receive one-time payments of $150 or $1500 or more; 319 owners
of unregistered works would receive payments starting at $5. 320
Following a detour through the Supreme Court on an unrelated
jurisdictional issue, 321 the Second Circuit rejected the settlement for
inadequate representation. 322
On the way to this holding, however, the court also dealt with the
future-conduct issue. The objectors had invoked the identical factual
Unlike the Google Books settlement’s toggleable right to Exclude, however, this back-end
opt-out right was a one-time option.
318. See id. § 3.a, at *116 (minimum); id. § 3.f, at *119 (maximum).
319. See id. § 4.a–.b, at *122–23.
320. See id. § 4.c, at *123. Older (i.e. pre-1995) works were subject to discounts from
these payments, see id. § 4.d, at *123–24, and individual payments were to be scaled down
if the total claims exceeded $18 million, see id. § 4.f, at *124–25. No copyright owner’s
payment, however, could be reduced beneath $5. See id. § 4.j, at 126.
321. Despite objections from some class members, the district court approved the
settlement in an unreported, completely pro forma order. Order for Final Approval of
Settlement and Final Judgment, In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig.,
654 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2011) (Nos. 05–5943–cv(L), 06–0223), reprinted in Joint Appendix at
107, Reed Elsevier Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010) (No. 08-103), 2009 WL
1423539, at *152. The objectors appealed, but instead of addressing their arguments on the
merits, the Second Circuit sua sponte ordered briefing on whether the district court had
jurisdiction to approve the settlement at all. See In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases
Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2007) rev’d sub nom Reed Elsevier, Inc., 130 S.
Ct. 1237. The Second Circuit’s theory was that since the Copyright Act requires
registration of United States works with the Copyright Office as a precondition to file suit
for infringement, the class members whose works were unregistered were never properly
before the district court. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006). After briefing, the Second Circuit
indeed ruled that the requirement was jurisdictional, and so vacated the settlement. See In
re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 116, 128 (2nd. Cir. 2007),
rev’d sub nom Reed Elsevier, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1237. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 129 S. Ct. 1523 (2009). Since the plaintiffs,
defendants, and objectors below all argued for jurisdiction (they disagreed only over the
settlement’s substantive terms), the Supreme Court also appointed an amicus curiae to
defend the Second Circuit’s opinion. See Reed Elsevier, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 1240. After
argument, the Court reversed the Second Circuit 8–0; Justice Sotomayor, who had been
the district judge in Tasini I, supra note 308, recused herself. See Reed Elsevier, Inc., 130 S.
Ct. at 1240. While the Court declined to decide whether a federal court would be obliged
to grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss an infringement case involving an unregistered
copyright, id. at 1249, it held that the registration requirement was not a limit on the
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1241. Thus, the Court remanded for
consideration of the settlement’s merits, leading to the Literary Works opinion we are here
concerned with. Id. at 1241. For an approving discussion of Reed Elsevier, see Howard M.
Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings”, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 947,
961 (2011).
322. See In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d at 257–58.
Thus the court of appeals accepted the objectors’ original argument, albeit six years later.
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predicate doctrine, arguing that “future infringements are distinct
harms giving rise to independent claims of relief, with factual
predicates that are different from authors’ past infringement
claims.” 323 The court, however, looked to the complaint:
Objectors’ first argument fails to recognize that the
consolidated complaint seeks injunctive relief for future uses,
and therefore contemplates these alleged future injuries. Put
another way, a trial of this case would determine whether it is
permissible for publishers to continue to sell and license the
works. Accordingly, regardless of whether future infringements
would be considered independent injuries, the Settlement’s
release of claims regarding future infringements is not
improper. 324
This was the correct result, and for almost the correct reason. The
Literary Works settlement was consistent with the parity-ofpreclusion test because the publishers had already, for years, been
licensing the articles to the databases. If the publishers had won on
their theory of the case—that the freelancers had granted implied
licenses for database uses—then issue preclusion would have barred
the freelancers from objecting to those uses in the future, even if they
constituted separate acts of reproduction leading to separate
infringements. Thus, the settlement permitted publishers to do no
more than they could have won at trial. The court correctly focused
on what would have been “determin[ed]” by a “trial of this case,” 325
as the parity of preclusion demands. The only thing that is slightly off
here is the emphasis on the complaint at all. What matters are the
underlying facts about the defendant’s past conduct; the complaint is
of course not conclusive as to the facts it alleges. 326
The contrast between Authors Guild and Literary Works nicely
illustrates the workings of the parity-of-preclusion test. In Authors
Guild, Google had never sold complete copies of the plaintiffs’ books,
and it was not about to. In Literary Works, however, the publishers
had been licensing, and the databases had been displaying, the articles
for years. They had plausible arguments that doing so was legal, and
one court even agreed with them. The same future conduct that was a
major break from the defendant’s past conduct in Authors Guild was

323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 248.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id.
See supra Part IV.A.
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a continuation of the defendant’s past conduct in Literary Works. The
former was an improper settlement; the latter was proper.
C.

Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease

Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc. 327 involved
dueling class actions over early termination fees (ETFs) in auto leases
issued by the defendant, GECAL. 328 The first class action, the
“Williams” suit, settled: the class included individuals who entered
into a lease assigned to GECAL between January 1, 1987 and July 21,
1995, and settled “all claims which might have been asserted in the
Actions . . . arising out of disclosures made on or in connection with
vehicle leases assigned to GECAL, out of the reasonableness or
validity of the charges and other terms contained in such leases, and
out of the collection or attempted collection of charges imposed
under such lease forms.” 329 The court approved the Williams
settlement in December 1995, and entered a final judgment in
January 1996. 330
The second class action, the “Dooner” suit, was filed in July
1996. 331 When GECAL asked the district court in the Williams case to
enforce an anti-suit injunction against the Dooner plaintiffs, 332 they
argued that the injunction did not apply to them because none of
them had terminated their leases as of the July 21, 1995 cut-off
date. 333 Thus, they claimed, their claims against GECAL were not
ripe as of the Williams settlement, and they were therefore not
subject to its releases. 334
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the trial court’s injunction
against the Dooner suit 335 in a carefully reasoned but ultimately
misguided opinion. It started by noting that the Williams complaint
raised two kinds of claims: failure to disclose the ETFs in the leases,
and charging unreasonable ETFs. 336 The former were ripe
immediately, but there was a substantial question as to whether the
327. 159 F.3d 266 (7th Cir. 1998).
328. Id. at 268.
329. Id. at 271.
330. See Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, No. 94-C-7410, 1995 WL 765266,
at *11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 26, 1995) [hereinafter Williams I], aff’d, 159 F.3d 266 (7th Cir. 1998)
[hereinafter Williams II].
331. See Williams II, 159 F.3d at 271 (describing the Dooner suit).
332. See id. at 272.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. Id. at 275.
336. See id. at 273.
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latter were ripe before a customer actually terminated the lease and
was charged an unreasonable ETF. 337 Thus, the Dooner plaintiffs
were unquestionably members of the Williams class and
unquestionably had ripe disclosure claims against GECAL that the
Williams settlement could release. 338
The court should have stopped there. The settlement released
only “all claims which might have been asserted” in the Williams
action. 339 If the Dooner plaintiffs’ unreasonable-ETF claims were
truly unripe as of July 21, 1995, then the Williams settlement by its
own terms did not purport to release them. It is not even necessary to
invoke parity of preclusion.
Instead, the Seventh Circuit justified the injunction on the basis
of the identical factual predicate doctrine. It reasoned that the factual
predicate was “the leases and the potential for an early termination
penalty,” so that “even if the [unreasonable ETF] claims were not
ripe, they were closely enough related to the disclosure claims that
everything could be resolved in the settlement.” 340 This argument
illustrates the dangers of taking the identical factual predicate
doctrine at face value. The problem is that to the extent the
unreasonable-ETF claims were unripe, it was because they involved
future conduct: GECAL’s contingent attempts to impose fees when a
consumer actually terminated her auto lease. Thus, the Seventh
Circuit approved a future-conduct release without entirely realizing
it.
It is hard at this distance to say whether this was harmless or
prejudicial error. One possibility is that “the computation of the early
termination payments might be ministerial at any given point in
time.” 341 If so, then parity of preclusion would have allowed the
Williams releases to cover the unreasonable-ETF claims: the essential
legal issues could all have been squarely presented as of July 21, 1995.
But it is also possible that GECAL retained sufficient discretion
under the leases to charge either reasonable or unreasonable ETFs. If
so, then litigation over the leases could not establish the propriety of
the fees; neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion would apply to
the unreasonable-ETF claims.
Indeed, on this view, the Williams settlement gives a nice
illustration of moral hazard in future-conduct releases. Class
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 274.
Id.
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members received $50 or $100 certificates. 342 But, as one of the
objectors pointed out, the ETFs could be $1,000 or more, 343 and
GECAL did not make any promises about the ETFs it would charge
customers who terminated their leases after the settlement
deadline. 344 The settlement freed GECAL to max out the ETFs it
collected without fear of the legal consequences. After all, the
settlement order enjoined leaseholders from suing over the
“collection or attempted collection of charges imposed under such
lease forms.” 345 A $100 coupon for a legally risk-free $1,000 ETF is a
good trade from GECAL’s perspective, but perhaps less so from class
members’ perspective. This is not to say that the Seventh Circuit was
necessarily wrong to enforce the settlement—only that it did not
provide a convincing response to the future-conduct issue it
identified.
D. Uhl v. Thoroughbred Technology & Telecommunications, Inc.
In Uhl v. Thoroughbred Technology and Telecommunications,
a telecommunications company known colloquially as TInc.,
Cubed announced plans to lay fiber-optic cables along Norfolk
Southern Railway rights of way. 347 A class of landowners along the
route objected, bringing slander-of-title and trespass claims that the
railroad’s easements did not include cable-laying rights. 348 In a
settlement filed the same day, the class agreed, in effect, to grant TCubed the necessary easements in exchange for cash compensation. 349
An objector claimed that the case was nonjusticiable because the
class members had only “future claims.” 350 The Seventh Circuit
disagreed and upheld the settlement, explaining that the plaintiffs’
slander of title claims were already ripe, so that:
346

342. See id. at 271.
343. See id.
344. See Williams I, 1995 WL 765266, at *8.
345. Id. at *2.
346. 309 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2002).
347. See id. at 978.
348. Id. at 980.
349. See id. at 982. The actual settlement called for all of the landowners to become
shareholders of a new company, Class Corridor. See id. The landowners would grant
easements to Class Corridor, which in turn would grant an easement to T-Cubed and
become an ongoing participant in the cable-laying, owning fiber of its own and receiving
ongoing royalties. See id. These details are not directly relevant to the future-conduct
analysis.
350. Id. at 984.
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This is enough to permit the court to address the entire suit,
including the claims for trespass and the injunction. On these
facts, those claims are in no way hypothetical; their immediacy
and their relation to the slander claim is enough to permit the
court to address the entire controversy. 351
This time the result was arguably consistent with the parity-ofpreclusion test. T-Cubed’s past conduct—its announcement of plans
to lay cable—really did open it to a slander-of-title suit. That suit
would have tested T-Cubed’s right to lay cable and, if T-Cubed had
won, its newly-confirmed easements would have protected it also
from the trespass claims. True, T-Cubed had not actually gone on
anyone’s land. But considering its course of conduct, it is factually
reasonable to say that the future-conduct cable-laying would have
been a continuation of the past-conduct announcement.
Of course, this conclusion is debatable to the extent that it
depends on the factual finding that T-Cubed had real and immediate
plans to lay cable. There is more than a whiff of collusion about Uhl
and other railroad-corridor settlement class actions. 352 Close scrutiny
of the settlement’s commercial terms—which the court appears to
have engaged in—was entirely appropriate.
E.

Alvarado v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority

Another easement case, Alvarado v. Memphis-Shelby County
Airport Authority, 353 is also illuminating. With FAA approval, the
defendant Airport Authority planned to expand operations at the
Memphis International Airport. 354 Nearby landowners sued in a class
action, claiming inverse condemnation. The settlement required class
members to transfer an avigation easement to the Airport Authority
in exchange for compensation. 355 Functionally, this is eminent domain
via class-action settlement. But notice the procedural posture: the
plaintiffs sued in inverse condemnation: that is, they asked the court
not to block the taking but to provide them with just compensation
351. Id.
352. See, e.g., Smith v. Sprint Commc’n Co., 387 F.3d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 2004) (vacating
approval of similar settlement for failure of adequate representation). See generally Nels
Ackerson, Right-of-Way Rights, Wrongs and Remedies: Status Report, Emerging Issues,
and Opportunities, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 177 (2003) (discussing rationale and history of
right-of-way class actions); Alison Frankel, Blood on the Tracks, AM. LAW., June 2002, at
14 (discussing struggle between two groups of plaintiffs’ law firms for control over fiberoptic class actions).
353. Nos. 99–5159 & 99–5162, 2000 WL 1182446 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 2000).
354. See id. at *1.
355. See id. at *3.
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for it. That is what the tort is for, and the settlement reflected an
outcome entirely consistent with litigation. 356
Thus, when the court approved the settlement, it did so
consistently with the parity-of-preclusion test. Alvarado even came
close to recognizing that the real question is similarity of legal issues.
The court wrote, “The release in the settlement agreement is not a
general release, but a release which reserved certain claims and
barred only prospective claims of the same character as set forth in
the restated complaint.” 357 Replace “of the same character” with
“raising the same legal issues” and be willing to go behind the face of
the complaint to the defendant’s actual past conduct, and you have
the parity-of-preclusion test.
F.

UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp.

In UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 358 Rupert Murdoch’s media
corporation, which had been incorporated in Australia, announced
plans to reincorporate in Delaware. 359 Australian corporate law
prohibits adopting a poison pill without a shareholder vote; Delaware
corporate law does not. 360 Multiple institutional investors threatened
to vote against the reincorporation, so the News Corporation (“News
Corp.”) board adopted a policy that it would not adopt or extend a
poison pill without a shareholder vote. 361 Following the
reincorporation, a hostile acquirer showed up; the board immediately
turned around and adopted a poison pill. 362
The institutional investors sued over the failure to hold a
shareholder vote, and got claims for breach of contract and
promissory estoppel past a motion to dismiss. 363 While the case went
up on appeal, settlement talks began, and the parties filed a proposed
settlement in early 2006. 364 Under the settlement, News Corp. would
submit its pill for a shareholder vote at its October 2006 meeting. The
case was to be certified as a class action, and class members would
356. The parallels to the cases in which courts award permanent damages in lieu of an
injunction are, of course, direct. Cf. supra Part IV (discussing the similarities between
orders denying an injunction but allowing permanent damages and those allowing future
conduct releases in exchange for cash compensation).
357. Alvarado, 2000 WL 1182446, at *7 (emphasis added).
358. 31 DEL J. CORP. L. 1186, 1202 (Del. Ch. 2005) [hereinafter UniSuper I].
359. Id. at 1202.
360. See id. at 1188.
361. See id. at 1190.
362. See id. at 1191.
363. See id. at 1202.
364. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 898 A.2d 344, 346 (Del. Ch. 2006).
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release News Corp. from any liability for the extension of the pill at
the shareholder meeting. Liberty Media, the would-be acquirer,
objected. 365
The court considered the future-conduct release categorically
impermissible. Because the October 2006 meeting had not yet
happened, it could not be the factual predicate giving rise to the
lawsuit:
Thus, it follows that a release is overly broad if it releases
claims based on a set of operative facts that will occur in the
future. If the facts have not yet occurred, then they cannot
possibly be the basis for the underlying action. . . . 366
The court then generalized:
The rule in Delaware is that a release cannot apply to future
conduct. Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that
there is an exception for future conduct arising out of, or
contemplated by, the settlement itself. . . . For these reasons, I
conclude that the release is overly broad in that it attempts to
release claims arising from an event that has not yet happened,
viz., the October 2006 Rights Plan. 367
This cannot be right, at least as stated. This rule would effectively
make impossible any settlement that reaches future conduct—even if
the propriety of that future conduct is precisely the issue at stake in
the lawsuit. The court’s description of the proposed settlement made
it sound like a resounding win for class members: they wanted a
shareholder vote on the poison pill, and News Corp. agreed that it
would submit its pill for a vote at the forthcoming October 2006
shareholder meeting. 368 Not only does it seem reasonable to allow
News Corp. a release for doing what the class demanded of it, but
also the opinion provided no reason to think that submitting the plan
for a vote could violate class members’ rights in the first place. Thus,
the settlement would appear to have been consistent with the parityof-preclusion test, and the court’s distrust of it comes across as
unwarranted.
Nonetheless, the court may have reached the right result for
reasons that do not appear in the opinion itself. It appears from the
briefing in the case that the original (non-class) lawsuit focused on the
propriety of adopting a poison pill without a shareholder vote, but
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 346.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 348.
Id.
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that the release would have also arguably covered the merits of the
poison pill itself. 369 What is more, the class action was framed as a
mandatory, non-opt-out class. 370 Thus, the settlement would
effectively have deprived Liberty Media of any substantive right to
object to the terms of the pill. This was a serious problem with the
settlement, and provided more than sufficient reason to reject it.
News Corp. was collusively buying off the outside investors who
objected to the lack of a shareholder vote in order to steal a march on
Liberty Media and strip it of some of its rights as a shareholder. If so,
then the court should have explained that this was the real reason the
settlement was unacceptable, and grounded its holding elsewhere in
class-action and corporate law.
G. Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club
In Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 371 the NFL sold
satellite TV access to its games, but only as part of an all-inclusive
Sunday Ticket bundle for $139 a season. 372 In 1997, a class of 1.8
million Sunday Ticket purchasers sued the NFL and five teams,
claiming that the bundling violated the Sherman Act. 373 After the
NFL lost a motion to dismiss based on a statutory exemption in the
Sports Broadcasting Act, the parties negotiated a proposed
settlement. 374
Under the settlement, the NFL would have paid $7.5 million to
class members and offered them 10–15% discounts on NFL
merchandise. 375 Going forward, the NFL would have been required to
offer individual weeks via satellite at $29.99, along with the season
package for $159. 376 In exchange, class members would have been
required to release antitrust claims against the NFL for its satellite,
broadcast, cable, or Internet broadcasts of NFL games, including for
conduct undertaken each year the settlement remained in effect. 377
The court rejected the settlement on multiple grounds, the most
significant of which was the scope of the releases. First, the court

369. See Liberty Media Corp.’s Objection to the Proposed Settlement at 1, UniSuper
Ltd., 898 A.2d 344 (No. 1699–N).
370. See id. at 8.
371. 157 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
372. See id. at 565.
373. See id. at 565–66.
374. See id.
375. See id. at 566.
376. See id.
377. See id.

CITE AS 91 N.C. L. REV. 387 (2012)

2013]

CLASS-ACTION SETTLEMENTS

473

explained that the expansion from satellite broadcasts to other media
was problematic:
The plaintiffs’ complaint does not suggest that they have
asserted any claims with respect to NFL programming by
broadcast, cable television, or the Internet. Nevertheless, under
the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the defendants would
be released from all claims regarding their programming of
NFL football games regardless of the technology involved or
the method of distribution of those games (e.g., in a form that
bundles those games as does NFL Sunday Ticket or in a form
that does not). 378
This rationale—that cable and Internet bundling were not at
issue in the underlying lawsuit, only satellite bundling—is easy to
understand in terms of the parity-of-preclusion test. Because of the
medium-by-medium structure of telecommunications regulation,
those other media presented substantially different legal issues. Nor
did the settlement require that the NFL’s offerings on cable and the
Internet parallel the offerings it made via satellite. A win for the NFL
at trial would not have been conclusive on the legality of its cable and
Internet broadcasts, and so a settlement could not reach them, either.
But the parity-of-preclusion test probably would not have blocked a
settlement that included a prospective release for claims arising out of
the revised satellite offerings the NFL proposed. These practices were
directly at issue in the underlying suit, the NFL’s proposal was
unambiguously more moderate than its past practices, and a victory at
trial for the NFL would have let it offer the programs the settlement
authorized.
The court also gave a second, broader explanation for its holding:
The release is also too broad because it bars later claims based
on future conduct. Although the law permits a release to bar
future claims based on the past conduct of the defendant, this
release would bar later claims based not only on past conduct
but also future conduct. 379
This flat rule against future-conduct releases may sound too
sweeping. But recall that Schwartz was an antitrust case: and antitrust
law carries a strong public policy against private ordering that would
displace its rules. Future-conduct releases for antitrust claims are
impermissible in settlements, regardless of whether they are class
378. Id. at 575–76.
379. Id. at 578. It is not entirely clear whether the court itself considered these two
holdings to be distinct.
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actions or not. 380 Thus, the settlement could not prospectively bless
any form of bundling; at most it could resolve claims for past
bundling. This second holding is not really about class actions or
parity of preclusion; it is a holding about antitrust law. 381
CONCLUSION
We must plan for the future, but we have a choice as to how.
Individuals can make plans for themselves, with promises and
waivers. Governments can make plans for society, with laws and
regulations. 382 Contract and legislation are the two great and
legitimate tools of planning: one private and one public. Contract
reflects individual autonomy: it justifies its far-reaching power
because the parties themselves have consented to their bargain.
Legislation reflects societal agreement: it justifies its far-reaching
power because elections keep legislators broadly accountable to the
people. Each kind of planning has its proper sphere, each is legitimate
within that sphere, and there is a crucial role for both in a free and
democratic society.
But future-conduct releases are a “monstrous hybrid” between
private and public planning, the worst of both worlds. 383 They impose
plans on people who have never heard of or consented to them—but
they are negotiated by self-interested private parties rather than
elected representatives. Courts are planners of last resort: their job is
to sort out the consequences of past plans gone awry, not to make
new plans. 384 Courts bearing future-conduct releases undermine both

380. See supra Part I.B.
381. The court eventually approved a narrower settlement that excluded future claims
and media other than satellite TV. See Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd.,
No. 97–5184, 2001 WL 1689714, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2001), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1796
(2012); accord Grunewald v. Kasperbauer, 235 F.R.D. 599, 607 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (approving
settlement that did not “release defendants from claims based on future conduct”);
Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 244 (D.N.J. 2005) (approving
release of “future claims for conduct that occurred in the past” and noting that settlement
did not release claims for “future conduct”).
382. See generally SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 155 (2011) (defining law as “social
planning”).
383. The term is Jane Jacobs’s. See JANE JACOBS, SYSTEMS OF SURVIVAL: A
DIALOGUE ON THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMMERCE AND POLITICS 75–77 (1992);
Timothy B. Lee, Jane Jacobs and the Problem of Monstrous Hybrids, DISRUPTIVE ECON.
BLOG (Jan. 13, 2012, 9:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2012/01/13/janejacobs-and-the-problem-of-monstrous-hybrids/.
384. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Commentary, The Making of The
Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2038 (1994) (“A court in making law is bound to
base its action, not on free judgment of relative social advantage, but on a process of
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individual autonomy and democratic decision-making. When courts
take thought for the morrow, they make it harder for individuals and
legislatures to do the same. Bad planners drive out good.
Future-conduct settlements are a valuable part of any judicial
toolkit that includes class actions and settlements. But they must be
understood—and employed—strictly as a way to resolve disputes
without the uncertainty and expense of motion practice and trial.
They can legitimately do what a lawsuit could do, no more, and then
only under close supervision. Anything further is playing with fire.
In this age of political decay, future-conduct class-action
settlements are a sore temptation. The copyright system is broken;
perhaps class actions could fix it. 385 So are the health-care system, the
financial system, and so much else besides. These unfolding disasters
are far beyond the capacity of any one person to salvage, or even
escape; Congress is busy demonstrating that the baleful influence of
its neglect is rivaled only by the baleful influence of its attention. So
why not turn things over to the courts, Mephistopheles asks: why not
let future-conduct releases serve as the foundation for a new form of
social reform?
This attitude amounts to the belief that “[o]ne branch is broken,
so let’s break another branch.” 386 The solution to a broken,
systematically compromised political system is to fix the system. 387
Unbounded future-conduct settlements are an evasion of
responsibility, an admission of defeat. The turn to them is a turn away
from the rule of law.

reasoned development of authoritative starting-points.” (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr.)
(quotation marks omitted)).
385. But see Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
(forthcoming 2012/2013) (“The simple fact is that all societies already possess an
institution designed to overcome collective action barriers to common security and the
proper allocation of burdens and resources: the state, in its most basic Hobbesian
functions. The class action offers an alternative form of collective organization to the state,
but a form of collective organization without the elements of popular participation,
political consent, and electoral accountability that justify governmental authority in a
democracy. That delegation of collective authority to an institution without the democratic
pedigree of the state demands some justification . . . .”).
386. Norman Oder, Samuelson Says Google Book Settlement Doesn’t Reflect ‘Public
Trust Responsibilities’, LIBR. J. (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.libraryjournal.com
/article/CA6701727.html (quoting Pamela Samuelson).
387. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011) (describing unchecked “dependence
corruption” in Congress).

